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This dissertation examines the relationship between a firms finances
and its response to trade liberalization. Understanding how firms with different
financial structures react to a major trade liberalization event sheds light both
on an important real effect of financial frictions as well as on the underlying
mechanisms of reorganization in the U.S. manufacturing sector. In the first
chapter, I summarize the nascent yet growing literature at the intersection of
corporate finance and trade economics and lay out the contribution of this
research.
In the second chapter, I provide institutional details on the natural
experiment that lies at the heart of my empirical analysis. The conferral of
Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) status to China, effective 2001,
reduced uncertainty about future trade costs and facilitated investment in set-
ting up import and distribution networks in China. I discuss the validity of
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the PNTR shock, arguing that it was an unexpected and material relaxation of
trade barriers between the U.S. and China. I also lay out the main hypotheses
relating firm finances and responses to freer trade. Increased import compe-
tition may represent a threat for many U.S. firms, especially those lacking
the financial resources to properly respond. However, the opening of Chinese
labor markets and the possibility of offshoring likely represents an important
opportunity for firms with the financial wherewithal to invest in overseas pro-
duction and import networks. While both channels translate to large domestic
job losses, the underlying mechanisms and the firms responsible for the losses
are very different.
In the third and final chapter I use the PNTR shock, along with micro-
level data from the U.S. Census Bureau, to empirically assess how firm finances
relate to trade responses. I find larger manufacturing job losses in better cap-
italized firms - those with less leverage and more cash on hand. The effects
concentrate in industries where weaker balance sheets are likely to lead to
collateral and other borrowing constraints, helping rule out alternative expla-
nations. Finally, domestic manufacturing job losses are not accompanied by
greater reductions in sales or aggregate employment, but better capitalized
firms do exhibit reduced input costs, increased productivity, and are more
likely to invest in establishing import networks in China. These findings point
to offshoring as the predominant firm response to trade liberalization and sug-
gest a role for financial capacity in facilitating offshoring investments.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Overview
China’s integration into global markets has induced wholesale changes
in the U.S. economy and, consequently, in economists’ understanding of the
impacts of trade. While consumers and manufacturing workers stand out re-
spectively as winners and losers, the implications for other economic entities
are less clear. In particular, how trade liberalization affects domestic manufac-
turing firms, who are responsible for the mass layoffs, is still an open question.
Increased import competition may represent a threat for many U.S. firms, es-
pecially those lacking the financial resources to properly respond.1 However,
the opening of Chinese labor markets and the possibility of offshoring likely
represents an important opportunity for firms with the financial wherewithal
to invest in overseas production and import networks. While both channels
translate to large domestic job losses, the underlying mechanisms and the firms
responsible for the losses are very different.
In this dissertation, I examine the relationship between a firm’s fi-
1A long-standing literature links financial fragility to competitive vulnerability. See, for
example, Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), Zingales (1998), and Fresard (2010).
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nances and its response to the conferral of Permanent Normal Trade Rela-
tions (PNTR) status to China - a landmark reduction in trade barriers that
occurred in 2001. My analysis has two primary objectives. The first is to
assess whether a firm’s financial standing shapes its response to the threats
and opportunities precipitated by trade liberalization. The second is to shed
light on the predominant mechanism of trade adjustment in the U.S. economy.
Using restricted micro-data from the U.S. Census Bureau, I find larger em-
ployment reductions at well capitalized firms (those with higher cash reserves
and lower debt ratios), consistent with offshoring representing the dominant
response to the PNTR. Further supporting this interpretation, I find that job
losses are accompanied by a reduction in input costs, increased productivity at
surviving domestic operations, and a higher likelihood of offshoring to China.
All together, these findings establish a material connection between a firm’s
financial policy and its response to liberalized trade.
China’s economic growth serves as a unique laboratory for studying
the effects of and responses to trade liberalization. The “China Shock” is
both large and unexpected, rendering it perhaps the closest approximation
to a natural experiment in trade economics (Autor et al. (2016b)). PNTR
specifically represents a landmark reduction in trade barriers with China that
has been directly linked to U.S. manufacturing job losses in the most affected
industries (Pierce and Schott (2016)). The policy made permanent previously
temporary tariff reductions on Chinese imports, removing uncertainty about
2
future trade costs.2 Crucially, exposure to PNTR depends on industry specific
tariffs originally set by the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, which are unlikely
to be incidentally related to changes in firm policies around the time of PNTR’s
adoption. I therefore exploit this exogenous industry-level variation in the
difference between the Smoot-Hawley tariffs and the normal trade relations
(NTR) tariffs that PNTR made permanent (the NTR Gap) to measure the
policy’s effects.
I begin by analyzing the internal validity of the PNTR experiment.
While previous work has established that higher NTR Gap industries exhibit
greater post-PNTR Chinese import penetration as well as steeper domestic
manufacturing job loss, I focus on market responses as a validation mechanism.
Specifically, I show firm abnormal returns covary significantly with their NTR
Gap on days in which the market learns new PNTR-related information. I
find that each 10% in the NTR Gap leads to abnormal returns that are about
45 basis points higher. Furthermore, I use implied volatility data to show that
equity and options markets attached significant uncertainty to the PNTR vote,
which helps confirm that stock price movements on the day of the vote are
attributable to the resolution of uncertainty following PNTR’s passage.
Next I proceed to analyze how firms with different levels of financial
capacity respond to the PNTR shock. I first examine how domestic employ-
2Throughout this dissertation, the term “Chinese imports” refers to U.S. imports of goods
from China. Both arms-length as well as related-party imports from China are subject to
tariffs.
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ment, which is perhaps the most useful gauge of a firm’s domestic manufac-
turing footprint, adjusts to PNTR. Like Pierce and Schott (2016), I find that
more exposed firms - i.e. those operating in higher NTR Gap industries - ex-
perience larger post-PNTR employment losses. On average, firms with above-
median NTR Gaps exhibit employment declines that are 10% larger than
below-median firms. Interestingly, I find that within the high exposure group,
stronger balance sheets actually translate to larger employment declines. High
NTR Gap firms with below (above) median industry-adjusted leverage (cash)
ratios exhibit employment losses that are 6-8% larger than their more poorly
capitalized peers. These estimates are robust to controlling for firm size and
age, unobserved inter-industry heterogeneity, and employment pre-trends.
I also measure employment responses at the plant level. Among surviv-
ing plants, a 10% (5%) decrease (increase) in debt (cash) is on average asso-
ciated with an amplified sensitivity of employment to PNTR by 70% (120%).
That same change in leverage (cash) is associated with a 20% (70%) higher
likelihood of plant closure relative to the baseline effect of PNTR. This finding
is consistent with a permanent reduction in domestic manufacturing activity.
What drives these employment results? It is unlikely that better fi-
nanced firms are less suited to face import competition. However, offshoring
is a plausible explanation. Trade economists agree that offshoring, whether
through direct investment, partnerships with Chinese firms, or production con-
tracting, requires significant upfront investment in physical capital, develop-
ing relationships, establishing distribution networks, training, monitoring, and
4
regulatory compliance. Given the established literatures on financing frictions
and investment (Fazzari et al. (1988)) and on capital structure and stakehold-
ers (Titman (1984)), it is natural to posit that financially stronger firms are
best positioned to capitalize on the offshoring opportunities presented by freer
trade.
Of course, a causal inference of how financial frictions shape trade re-
sponses requires that the variation in financial ratios, which I measure two
years prior to PNTR, be orthogonal to any other unobserved characteristic
that may dictate post-PNTR employment. Much of the intra-industry disper-
sion in firm finances for my sample of mature manufacturing firms plausibly
meets this requirement. As Rajan and Zingales (1998) show, mature compa-
nies anticipate less incentive to actively manage their capital structures with
respect to investment needs.3 Therefore, owning to hysteresis stemming from
adjustment costs (Leary and Roberts (2005)) and shareholder-creditor conflicts
(Admati et al. (2018)), firms with similar optimal capital structures may actu-
ally exhibit large and persistent differences in observed capitalization ratios at
any given point in time.4 Of course, absent a way to isolate this “clean” vari-
ation, I cannot rule out competing hypotheses in general. However, I perform
a battery of tests to rule out multiple alternative explanations.
3The average age of manufacturing firms in my sample as of 1999 is over 20 years. Al-
mazan and Molina (2005) also argue that optimal capital structure calibration is most likely
to occur for young firms and show that intra-industry dispersion in leverage is positively
correlated with the industry’s maturity.
4These differences could arise due to past mergers, market timing of security issuance,
or changes in tax laws.
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I begin by addressing the concern that firms adjust their capital struc-
ture in anticipation of future offshoring activity. My results are robust to
using longer lags of leverage ratios and to using only firms whose pre-PNTR
financial ratios are likely unaffected by any preexisting offshoring plans. Next,
I address several specific omitted variable concerns. Weak balance sheets may
proxy for economic distress. Additionally, capital intensity is robustly corre-
lated with both debt (Titman and Wessels (1988)) and cash (Fresard (2010))
holdings. Finally, multi-national corporations may structure their finances
differently than strictly domestic firms. Any of these factors may result in a
spurious relationship between firm financing and PNTR-induced employment
losses. However, controlling for proxies of each alternative does not materially
change the results. Lastly, using a similar argument to Rajan and Zingales
(1998), I show that financial capacity leads to different post-PNTR employ-
ment responses predominantly for external finance dependent firms - i.e. those
that require large-scale investments or that exhibit longer cash-harvest peri-
ods. Financially dependent and poorly capitalized firms are more likely to
be subject to collateral and other borrowing constraints that severely depress
offshoring ability. Therefore, to the extent that inter-industry differences in
collateral requirements and project gestation periods are plausibly exogenous,
this cross-sectional relationship helps rule out alternative explanations more
generally.
To further validate the offshoring hypothesis, I examine several other
firm outcomes. First, I use data on reported offshoring in firms’ 10-Ks (as col-
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lected by Hoberg and Moon (2017) and Hoberg and Moon (2018)) to show that
better capitalized firms increase offshoring investment in China. I find that
each 10% increase in the NTR gap is associated with a 1.3% higher likelihood
that firms report material offshore operations in China. Importantly, a 10%
reduction in leverage is associated with an additional 0.98-1.4% increase on
top of the unconditional affect. Comfortingly, I find no significant interaction
between PNTR, firm finances, and offshoring to the rest of the world. I also
show that lower leverage and cash-rich firms exhibit increased post-PNTR debt
issuance, which is consistent with a superior ability to finance these offshoring
activities.
Next, I show that better capitalized firms do not exhibit sharper reduc-
tions in sales in response to PNTR. This test helps rule out the notion that
employment reductions are the result of competitive retrenchment. I also show
that the relationship between firm financial structure and post-PNTR employ-
ment holds only for domestic manufacturing workers, and not for international
or domestic non-manufacturing employees, suggesting firms are substituting
away from this labor input rather than instituting across-the-board cuts.
Finally, I find additional evidence consistent with the offshoring of inter-
mediate production by better capitalized firms. Using data on materials cost
from the quinennial Census of Manufacturers (CMF), I find that a 10% (5%)
decrease (increase) in debt (cash) is associated with 1.5% (8%) lower input
costs for inputs sourced from higher NTR Gap industries. Better capitalized
firms also exhibit a significant increase in domestic labor productivity, which
7
is consistent both with firms offshoring lower-skilled tasks and with efficiency
gains from offshoring. In contrast, I find no connection between firm finances,
PNTR, and domestic machinery expenditures, suggesting automation does not
play a significant role in this setting.
I close my analysis by relating my findings to the broader question of
the effects of trade liberalization on the U.S. economy. Specifically, I argue
that firms view offshoring as a benefit of, rather than a necessary competitive
response to, PNTR. Anecdotal evidence of the warm corporate reception of
the policy supports this interpretation. In addition, I find that firms operating
in higher NTR Gap industries exhibit larger abnormal returns in response to
both the initial trade agreement between China and the U.S. as well as the
actual PNTR vote.5 Across the two event dates, firms on average experience
0.45% higher abnormal returns for each 10% increase in the NTR gap. Also,
I show that higher exposure to PNTR translates to greater Chinese import
growth only in product markets open to foreign direct investment (FDI). A
10% increase in the NTR gap leads to 4.8% growth of Chinese imports for
products in which the Chinese goverment permits FDI, but to (insignificantly)
negative growth when FDI is restricted. This finding is more consistent with
offshoring investments driving Chinese import growth rather than the other
way around.
5As I argue in Chapter 2.2, both events yield material information regarding the effects
of Chinese trade liberalization.
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1.2 Literature
Spurred by recent advances in data availability as well as geopolitical
events (e.g. the rise of China on the global economic stage), the intersection of
corporate finance and international economics has become a burgeoning area
of research.6 Within this literature, this dissertation contributes to the re-
search on firm finances and entry into international trade. Manova (2013) and
Chaney (2016) show theoretically that financial frictions reduce export activ-
ity. The extant empirical research studies exporters from emerging markets
and Europe to verify these theoretical predictions. This dissertation extends
this logic to U.S. import market distortions as well and focuses on implications
for employment rather than trade flows.
This dissertation also contributes to the growing literature examining
the economic effects of Chinese trade on the U.S. economy (Autor et al. (2013),
Autor et al. (2014), Acemoglu et al. (2016), Pierce and Schott (2016)).7 While
manufacturing workers undoubtedly suffer from increased trade exposure, the
effect on firms is less conclusive. Autor et al. (2016a) and Hombert and Ma-
tray (2018) use supply-side shocks to Chinese manufacturers to argue that
import competition drives employment losses in U.S. manufacturers. In con-
trast, Magyari (2017) shows that firms more exposed to Chinese trade exhibit
larger employment growth and Bretscher (2018) finds lower risk premia for
industries with higher offshoring potential. A particularly related paper is Li
6See Fritz Foley and Manova (2015) for a survey of this literature.
7See Autor et al. (2016b) for a survey of this literature.
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et al. (2018), who show that foreign-owned, rather than Chinese, firms grow
more in response to the new investment opportunities created by PNTR. In
addition, they link this result to financing capacity by looking at variation in
“local finance” across different Chinese provinces. This research also argues
that firms benefit from freer trade and offshoring, but unlike Li et al. (2018),
it focuses on the domestic reorganization rather than foreign operations. In
addition, it analyzes the role of firm finances, which neither Magyari (2017)
nor Bretscher (2018) consider.8
This dissertation also relates to the large vein of research documenting
a negative association of investment with debt (Whited (1992), Lang et al.
(1996)) and a positive association with cash (Blanchard et al. (1994), Lamont
(1997), Rauh (2006)). This dissertation studies the relationship between finan-
cial capacity and offshoring, an investment decision with major implications
for labor and product markets. Furthermore, by documenting this relation-
ship, this dissertation provides empirical evidence of how firms with stronger
balance sheets capitalize on opportunities resulting from industrial shakeup.
While the role that financial resources play in firms’ ability to capitalize on pe-
riods of industrial turmoil is theoretically well understood (Shleifer and Vishny
(1992)), empirical evidence of this phenomenon is rarer.
Finally, this dissertation contributes to the literature on firm finances
8Bloom et al. (2018) also show that offshoring firms lay off more workers in response to
the Chinese trade shocks studied by Autor et al. (2013), but do not analyze its interaction
with firm finances.
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and employment. Papers in this literature either examine the adverse effects of
financial frictions on employment (Benmelech et al. (2011), Chodorow-Reich
(2013), Duygan-Bump et al. (2015)) or or the relationship between leverage
and the cyclicality of employment (Sharpe (1994), Giroud and Mueller (2017)).
This dissertation examines responses to a permanent macroeconomic shock
and relates stronger balance sheets to larger employment reductions.
11
Chapter 2
Institutional Setting & Hypothesis
Development
This chapter describes the institutional setting and develops the hy-
potheses for the paper. I first detail the most salient features of the PNTR
policy. I next proceed to show that firms and market participants all perceived
the policy change as having a material effect on the U.S. manufacturing sector.
Finally, I discuss why financial frictions may distort a firm’s trade response -
both with respect to competitive adjustments and offshoring investment - and
the implications for this dynamic on employment and other relevant outcomes.
2.1 Details of PNTR
2.1.1 History of China - U.S. trade relationship
Chinese imports were historically subject to the “column 2” (non-NTR)
tariff rates applicable to all “non-market” economies. These rates, which were
originally established by the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, are for the most
part substantially higher than the “column 1” tariffs that apply to countries
with whom the U.S. has established normal trade relations - e.g. other World
Trade Organization (WTO) members.
12
The Trade Act of 1974 established a mechanism by which non-market
economies could have its imports taxed under the “column 1” schedule on
a temporary basis. Prior to June 3 of each year, the Executive Branch can
recommend to Congress that an individual non-market economy should receive
an annual exemption from the “column 2” tariffs and instead have its imports
taxed at the “column 1” rates. Upon receipt of this recommendation, Congress
has 90 to pass a joint resolution in both the House and the Senate overriding
the Executive Branch’s recommendation. If said resolution is not passed, then
the recommendation stands until next year.
China had received the Executive’s exemption in each year since 1980
and through those first ten years, there was no dissent from Congress. How-
ever, following the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, the House actually
managed to pass a joint resolution against China’s exemption in 1990, 1991,
and 1992. While the Senate failed pass its own joint resolution, and subsequent
years saw neither chamber succeed in overriding the Executive’s exemption, the
annual requirement for both Presidential and Congressional approval creates
uncertainty about future exemptions being passed. I discuss the materiality
of this uncertainty in further detail in Section 2.2.
On May 24, 2000, the U.S. House of Representatives voted to make per-
manent the relatively low “column 1” tariff rate schedule for Chinese goods.1
PNTR is therefore unique in that it did not actually reduce effective tariffs,
1China’s PNTR status required Senate approval as well, but support for the bill in the
Senate had always been strong. The Senate passed the measure on September 19.
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Chinese goods had been taxed at the NTR rates since 1980, but rather it
removed uncertainty regarding U.S. tax policy vis-a`-vis Chinese goods. Presi-
dent Clinton signed the bill into law in October of that year. PNTR went into
effect upon China’s entry into the WTO in 2001. Accordingly, and in following
with Pierce and Schott (2016), I use 2001 onwards as the post-PNTR period.
In addition to serving as a useful laboratory for examining the effects
of trade liberalization on domestic employment and firm organization, PNTR
also facilitates the study of which firms capitalize on the opportunities that
arise in the wake of major industrial shakeup. While this dynamic is well
understood in theory, empirical evidence - e.g. labor poaching or buying assets
from distressed competitors - is relatively hard to obtain.2 In contrast, the
offshoring opportunities that manifested as a result of PNTR - which I discuss
in greater detail below - represent a tangible and detectable benefit for firms
with financial slack.
2.1.2 The NTR Gap
Starting with Pierce and Schott (2016), the literature has used the
difference between the “column 1” and “column 2” as a simple and intuitive
measure for capturing exposure to PNTR. Industries with larger difference
between the NTR and non-NTR tariffs, i.e. higher NTR Gaps, experienced a
bigger reduction in uncertainty upon’s PNTR passage. To calculate industry-
level NTR Gaps, I use the ad valorem equivalent NTR and non-NTR tariff
2Shleifer and Vishny (2011) provide a summary of the relatively scarce empirical evidence.
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rates from 1999 with data provided by Feenstra et al. (2002). These rates are
available for product codes using the Harmonized Commodity Description and
Coding System (HS). Industry NTR Gaps are averages of NTR Gaps for all of
the 8-digit HS products mapped to the industry. Table 2.1 lists the 10 highest
and lowest NTR Gap industries. Firm-level NTR Gaps are a weighted average
of the gaps for each industry in which the firm has domestic production.
2.2 Materiality of PNTR
Several factors support the conjecture that PNTR materially affects
Chinese import growth and domestic manufacturing employment. First, the
policy’s effect is sufficiently large as to plausibly induce firms to respond. The
average NTR Gap in 1999 is 33%.3 Second, since the NTR Gap is largely
driven by variations in non-NTR rates, which were set in the 1930s by the
Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, it is plausibly orthogonal to potential confound-
ing factors. Third, the bill’s passage was uncertain up until the day of the
House’s vote. As late as May 23 of 2000, the White House, which supported
the bill, was unsure if it had marshaled enough “yes” votes (Keto (2000)).
This uncertainty renders it unlikely that firms adjusted their behavior prior
to PNTR’s passage. Fourth, economic theory dictates that higher uncertainty
hinders corporate investment. For example, Pindyck (1993) shows that the
option value of waiting before making sunk investments is increasing in the
3Pierce and Schott (2016) reference several anecdotes of firms indicating that the uncer-
tainty regarding China’s NTR status materially affects their operations.
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uncertainty surrounding input costs and Handley and Limao (2015) apply this
specific logic to a model of trade cost uncertainty.4 Finally, as Pierce and
Schott (2016) show, the NTR Gap is strongly and causally connected with
higher rates of Chinese import growth and bigger drops in domestic manu-
facturing employment, suggesting it serves as a landmark reduction of trade
barriers.
Table 2.2 reports the correlation between the NTR Gap and various
other industry characteristics. The NTR Gap is negatively correlated with
capital intensity at the industry (column (1)) and firm (column (14)) levels.
It is also negatively correlated with skill intensity (columns (2) and (3)). It
is therefore possible that the NTR Gap is simply a proxy for the type of
manufacturing most easily replaced by Chinese imports. However, as Autor
et al. (2013) document, the initial stages of Chinese import penetration growth
and domestic manufacturing job losses were already occurring in the 1990s. If
the NTR Gap was simply a proxy for the type of manufacturing most easily
replaced by Chinese imports, then one would expect high NTR Gap industries
to exhibit larger import growth rates and bigger employment declines even
prior to the policy’s passage. The lack of correlation between the NTR Gap
and pre-PNTR changes in industry employment (column (4)), output (column
(5)), or Chinese import growth (column (6)) therefore assuage this concern.
Pierce and Schott (2016) further work to mitigate this concern by showing that
4It should be noted that, conditional on the NTR level, a higher NTR Gap implies higher
future expected tariffs, so that there exists a first-order effect as well.
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the NTR Gap is unassociated with large employment declines in the European
Union, where China had benefited from NTR status prior to PNTR’s passage.
2.2.1 Anecdotal Evidence
A skeptical reader may worry that since China’s NTR status was granted
in the twenty years prior to PNTR, the actual vote to grant China permanent
NTR status would not have had any practical effect. However, anecdotal ev-
idence from U.S. manufacturing firms and market participants prior to and
immediately after the PNTR vote helps confirm its material affect. Below I
present several examples of firms discussing how uncertainty regarding Chinese
import tariffs affects their decision making:
[U.S. firms] cited uncertainty surrounding the annual renewal of
Chinas most-favored-nation trade status as the single most impor-
tant issue affecting U.S. trade relations with China.
...
The annual MFN review process may also be a negative factor for
U.S. companies in securing financing for business transactions in
China from the international lending community.
United States General Accounting Office (1994)
We view the imposition conditions upon the renewal of MFN as
virtually synonymous with outright revocation... We cannot plan
and run our businesses if we are wondering whether our most im-
portant source of supply is about to disappear.
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Pearce (1996)
Further anecdotal evidence suggests that not only were firms worried
about the uncertainty induced by China’s temporary NTR status, they were
actively pushing for the passage of PNTR. A multitude of individual corpo-
rations and industry groups lobbied for and hailed the bill’s passage (Phillips
(2000a)). For example, the Business Roundtable, a coalition of over 200 large
corporations, spent over $9 million promoting PNTR (Phillips (2000b)). Addi-
tional anecdotes depicting the strong support of PNTR’s passage by corporate
interests are below:
The fact that the United States does not accord China permanent
NTR status creates uncertainty for America’s toy companies and
exposes them to unwelcome risk. While the risk that the United
States would withdraw NTR status from China may be small, if
it did occur the consequences would be catastrophic for U.S. toy
companies given the 70 percent non-MFN U.S. rate of duty appli-
cable to toys. As a result, Mattel strongly supports congressional
approval of legislation granting permanent NTR status to China
upon its WTO accession.
St. Maxens (2000)
High tech industry representatives Tuesday told House Republican
leaders during a closed meeting that gaining permanent normal
trade relations status for China is their top priority–and pledged
to help garner congressional support for passage...
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Congress Daily (2000)
Michael R. Bonsignore, Chief Executive Officer of Honeywell (NYSE:
HON), today urged members of the U.S. House of Representatives
Ways and Means Committee to grant Permanent Normal Trade Re-
lations (PNTR) status to China this year. Bonsignore said doing
so will enable U.S. companies and China to begin working toward
realizing the broad, mutual benefits of the recent U.S.-China WTO
(World Trade Organization) agreement.
Business Wire (2000)
There also exists anecdotal evidence that firms welcomed PNTR precisely
because it facilitated investment in China. Joseph Quinlan, an economist at
Morgan Stanley, describes PNTR as a “[D]eal about investment, not exports.”
in the Wall Street Journal (Cooper and Johnson (2000)). That same article
continues to state the following regarding the business community’s response
to PNTR’s passage
[B]usiness, which spent millions of dollars on advertising and lob-
bied vigorously for this outcome... played down its likely impact on
investment, leery of sounding supportive of labor union arguments
that the deal would prompt companies to move U.S. production to
China.
Not surprisingly, the reaction from organized labor groups was exactly anti-
thetical to that of business groups:
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With the AFL-CIO leading the way, organized labor has made
defeating the China trade legislation its number one priority this
year, and it is waging an aggressive effort to persuade Democrats
not to abandon their annual vote on China’s trade status.
Vita (2000)
While these anecdotes cannot substitute for systematic (i.e. economic and
econometric) proof, they serve as a useful primer for establishing that PNTR
materially impacts firms with domestic manufacturing operations.
2.2.2 Event Study
In search of systematic evidence that markets viewed the granting of
PNTR status to be a material event, I conduct an event study analysis. The
analysis considers two events that contained significant news about PNTR’s
possible passage. The first event is the November 15, 1999 signing of a bilat-
eral trade agreement between China and the U.S. The deal outlined a series
of concessions made by China, including a reduction in tariffs and easing of
restrictions on foreign investment. In return, the U.S. pledged to support
China’s WTO bid and, crucially for my analysis, vote on PNTR (New York
Times (1999)).
To understand the unexpected nature of the agreement, one should
consider that previous talks in April of that year had stalled and there was no
indication of a restart until the trade delegation was dispatched rather sud-
denly to China on November 9 (Associated Press (1999b)). Examination of
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press articles around the agreement indicates that the first mention of the sign-
ing occurred at 1:03 AM on November 15, 1999. Reports from after the close
of the market on November 14 suggest that no previous information leakage
regarding deal closure existed prior to its signing (Associated Press (1999a)).
In fact, the agreement was signed only after the U.S. trade representative had
agreed to stop at the Chinese Trade Ministry on her way out of the country
(Devereaux and Lawrence (2004)). Therefore, I use November 15 as the event
day for the agreement.
While the deal served as the first material step towards liberalizing
Sino-U.S. trade it would go into effect only upon China’s entry into the WTO,
and the Chinese had made clear their intention to link that step to the passage
of PNTR (Dow Jones Business News (1999)). Therefore, the second event I
consider is the Congressional vote on PNTR. President Clinton spear-headed
the push to pass PNTR, but faced strong resistance from labor groups and
many Democrats in the U.S. House of Representatives. Support for PNTR was
widespread in the Senate, but the House vote, which took place after market
close on May 24, 2000, was considered the largest obstacle to the policy’s
passage. Highlighting the uncertainty around the House vote, news reports
from May 23rd, the day before it was set to take place, suggest neither side
was confident it had secured enough support (Keto (2000)). Ultimately, the
House voted 237-197 in favor of PNTR. I use May 25 as the event day since
the vote took place after market hours.
Table 2.3 provides the results for abnormal (net of market) returns of
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manufacturing firms for each event separately as well as over both events. The
baseline results include only the event days (t), but I also consider an event
window of [t − 1, t + 10] for robustness.5 Both events are associated with
significantly positive abnormal returns on average - the average combined ab-
normal return for the two events is 1.93%. Importantly, firms operating in
higher NTR Gap markets exhibit larger abnormal returns for both the initial
agreement (column (1)), the PNTR vote (column (2)), and their sum (col-
umn (3)). A 10% increase in the NTR Gap corresponds to abnormal returns
that are 0.45% higher (column (3)). This effect is statistically significant and
economically meaningful as compared to the mean abnormal return over the
two events. The effects for the [t − 1, t + 10] window (columns (4)-(6)) are
even more striking. The event study analysis is thus consistent with markets
ascribing materiality to PNTR-related news.
2.2.3 Evidence from Options Markets
The event study analysis points to markets considering news about
PNTR to significantly affect firm valuations. However, there exists the concern
that some factor unrelated to PNTR may be driving the results in Table 2.3.
Two factors mitigating this concern are that markets react significantly to
multiple (2) instances PNTR-related news and that market responses depend
on the degree of exposure to PNTR (i.e. the NTR Gap).
5Results are qualitatively similar using a [t − 1, t + 5] window as well. They are also
robust to estimation using FGLS with an exponential heteroskedasticity specification.
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To further re-enforce the materiality of the policy change, I rely on
evidence from options markets. The intuition of the analysis is as follows.
If market participants anticipate a particular event, say the House vote on
PNTR, to significantly move stock prices, then uncertainty about the outcome
of the event should lead to higher expected volatility over any time horizon
that includes that event. Put another way, comparing the implied volatility
estimates from options whose maturity spans a political event to nearby op-
tions expiring outside of the event window can provide ex-ante evidence that
markets attach significant uncertainty to the event.6 As Kelly et al. (2016)
argue, options are uniquely suited to measuring the degree and materiality of
political uncertainty because they allow one to compare market expectations
around relatively short time horizons bracketing political events.
I operationalize the above logic in two ways. The first is running the
following generalized difference-in-difference regression
ImpV olf,t = θ1PostPNTRt ×NTRGapf + δf + δt + εf,t (2.1)
Where ImpV olf,t is the Black-Scholes implied volatility estimate (from
OptionMetrics) for firm f on day t, PostPNTRt is an indicator for days after
May 25, 2000, NTRGapf is the NTR Gap of firm f ’s industry, and δf and δt are
firm and day fixed effects respectively. The coefficient of interest is θ1 which
measures whether firms in higher NTR Gap industries (first difference) see
6This same logic underscores why the analysis is incompatible with the 11/15/99 event.
For markets to form ex-ante expectations on volatility, they would need to be aware of the
event, and be uncertain of its outcome, sufficiently in advance of it occurring.
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bigger reductions in implied volatility after the PNTR vote (second difference).
A significantly negative coefficient for θ1 suggests that for higher NTR Gap
industries, the implied volatility estimated over windows that cover the PNTR
vote date is significantly higher than the implied volatility estimated over
windows after the vote. This result would be consistent with markets ascribing
more uncertainty due to the PNTR vote to higher NTR Gap firms. I present
the result of the analysis in two ways. First, Figure 2.1 presents the daily
coefficients (θ1,k) from the following regression
ImpV olf,t=
6/30/00∑
k=5/1/00
[
θk1{t = k} ×NTRGapf
]
+ δf + δt + εf,t (2.2)
Where ImpV olf,t is the 30-day (interpolated) implied volatility mea-
sured as of day t over 5/1/00-6/30/00. As the Figure shows, implied volatility
estimates for higher NTR Gap firms drops significantly after the PNTR vote
(marked by the dashed red line), consistent with uncertainty being resolved
on that day. In addition, in Table 2.4, I report estimates of θ1 from (2.1) using
30- and 60-day horizons. In columns (1) and (2), I include all manufacturing
firms with available data. In columns (3) and (4), I restrict the analysis to
only firms with market caps that place them within the set of the 1,000 largest
domestic companies. For both horizons - and in both sub-samples - θ1 is sig-
nificantly negative. The estimates suggest that a 10% increase in NTR Gap
leads markets to expect an additional 0.84-1.01% volatility in returns due to
the PNTR vote.
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In addition to the difference-in-difference analysis, I also follow Kelly
et al. (2016) and assess the uncertainty surrounding the the PNTR vote in the
following way. First, I obtain implied volatility data for manufacturing firms
for all at the money (|∆| between .4 and .5) options that expire on 4/22/00,
6/17/00, and 7/22/00. These dates respectively correspond to dates a, b, and
c in Kelly et al. (2016) where a < τ < b < c and τ is the date of the PNTR
vote. Then, again following Kelly et al. (2016), for each firm f I calculate
ÎV fb = {MeanIV fb−s,b : b− s ∈ [τ − 20, τ − 1]}
That is ÎV fb is the average implied volatility for firm f over 20 different horizon
windows each ending at date b =6/17/00 and spanning the PNTR vote date
τ . By averaging implied volatility estimates over multiple options and about
one month’s worth of trading day horizons, I minimize day-to-day noise. I
then calculate
IV Df = ÎV fb −
1
2
(ÎV fa + ÎV
f
c ) (2.3)
Where ÎV fa and ÎV
f
c are calculated in an analogous way to ÎV
f
b , except the
date horizons end at date a =4/22/00 and c =7/22/00 respectively (and a− s
and c−s are chosen to have the same number of trading days as between b−s
and b).
The idea behind (2.3) is that options expiring around windows close
to event day τ , but not including it, should capture similar conditions for
firm f without capturing any volatility that markets ascribe to the political
event. They should therefore serve as valid controls for determining if expected
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volatility is indeed higher over windows that do span τ . Kelly et al. (2016)
argue that if markets indeed attach political uncertainty to the vote occurring
on day τ , then IV Df should be positive. Furthermore, it should be increasing
in the degree of uncertainty, which in this case means it that it should be
increasing in the firm’s NTR Gap. Confirming this analysis, I find that the
average IV Df in my sample is 0.025 (p-val of 0.001). This means that implied
volatility for options that span event day τ is 2.5% higher than the control
period. Furthermore, I find that high NTR Gap firms have IV Df that is
on average 3.44% higher (p-val of 0.031).7 These estimates corroborate the
idea that market participants anticipated material uncertainty resolution as a
result of the PNTR vote, and that this effect is larger for firms more affected
by the policy.
In closing this discussion, it is worth noting that PNTR is only one
of the relevant components contributing to the tremendous growth in Chinese
import penetration, many of which predate the policy. Autor et al. (2013) high-
light a myriad of supply-side shocks that increase Chinese export productivity.
These include a mass migration from rural to urban areas, the introduction of
previously-banned production technologies, and reduced restriction on foreign
inputs and capital goods. As both Pierce and Schott (2016) and Amiti et al.
(2017) show, PNTR is unrelated to much of the Chinese productivity growth
and therefore, the analysis that follows pertains only to the effects of easing
7I define high NTR Gap firms as those above the sample median.
26
Chinese trade barriers.8 In addition, the results in Chapter 3 apply only to the
set of large public manufacturers that comprise my analysis sample, although
Fort et al. (2018) show that these firms may be responsible for the bulk of
manufacturing employment losses since the 1970s.
2.3 Hypothesis Development
Having established PNTR as a material change in trade barriers be-
tween the U.S. and China, I proceed to discussing the main hypotheses of my
analysis. Each margin of trade adjustment, be it escaping foreign competition
or offshoring, requires significant investment. Given the long-established link
between financial capacity and investment, it is reasonable to surmise that
poorly capitalized firms are less able to optimally adjust to trade liberaliza-
tion. Furthermore, as I detail below, market-share-preserving and offshoring
investments carry dichotomous implications for domestic employment. There-
fore, looking at the trade-induced employment responses at well versus poorly
capitalized firms yields important insight not only into how firm finances shape
trade responses, but also into the primary mechanism of trade adjustment for
domestic manufacturing.
Firms looking to preserve market share in the face of foreign compe-
tition may need to make “active” investment in perceived (marketing) and
actual (R&D) product differentiation or “passive” investment in the form of
8I discuss the competitive and offshoring implications of supply-side shocks further in
Section 3.2.1.
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price competition. If financial frictions prevent firms from making these in-
vestments, one would expect weakly capitalized firms to shed workers as they
lose market share to low-cost foreign rivals. In concert with this logic, the-
oretical (Bolton and Scharfstein (1990)) and empirical (Fresard (2010)) work
in corporate finance establishes a link between firms’ balance sheets and their
resilience to product market competition - with the latter paper examining
import competition specifically.9 Thus, if financial frictions predominantly im-
pair competitive resilience, one should expect larger trade-induced job losses
at more poorly capitalized firms.
Alternatively, firms may respond to trade liberalization by offshoring
- i.e. substituting from domestic production to arms-length or related-party
imports - part or all of their domestic manufacturing facilities. For firm fi-
nances to generate meaningful cross-sectional employment predictions under
the offshoring hypothesis, two crucial assumptions must be met. The first is
that offshored production substitutes for domestic production. The second is
that financial frictions may preclude firms from engaging in offshoring.
Several recent papers find that firms substitute offshored production for
domestic employment. Ebenstein et al. (2014) show that offshoring has put
significant downward pressure on U.S. wages. Boehm et al. (2017) show that
multinationals account for an out-sized share of domestic manufacturing job
losses and connect this finding to increased offshoring. Finally, Monarch et al.
9See also Chevalier (1995), Zingales (1998), and Khanna and Tice (2000).
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(2017) find that offshoring firms exhibit large domestic employment declines
relative to a matched sample of non-offshorers. These results lend credence to
the hypothesis that offshored production displaces domestic workers.10
Firm finances may affect offshoring investments in two ways. First,
capital market frictions may inhibit the ability to finance entry into interna-
tional trade markets. The presence of trade market entry costs, which include
capital expenditures, costs of developing supply chains, training costs, costs
associated with regulatory compliance, monitoring costs, and costs associated
with integrating different cultural and business norms, is a hallmark of the
“heterogeneous firm” class of models popularized by Melitz (2003). The clas-
sical motivation for the high entry cost (Melitz-style) models is the strong
selection of firms into trade markets. Importing and exporting firms tend to
be larger, more productive, and more profitable even prior to engaging in in-
ternational trade. To demonstrate this “offshoring premium,” Appendix Table
A.1 presents summary statistics for the offshoring and non-offshoring manu-
facturers in the Compustat universe. Similar to the analysis in Monarch et al.
(2017), this table depicts differences in firm characteristics, measured in 1999,
between firms who subsequently are identified as offshorers and non-offshorers
using the data from the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program (see
Appendix A). While these univariate correlations come with the standard
10It should be noted that using BEA data, Desai et al. (2009) and Kovak et al. (2017)
do not find that FDI leads to reduced domestic employment. However, they do not
use establishment-level data and so cannot distinguish between manufacturing and non-
manufacturing employment.
29
caveats, they are informative in presenting several stylized facts regarding off-
shoring firms. Consistent with the entry-cost-induced selection framework,
offshoring firms tend to be ex-ante larger, more profitable, more productive,
and more capital intense.11
The large entry costs emphasized in Melitz (2003) suggest a role for cap-
ital market frictions. Manova (2013)) and Chaney (2016) extend the Melitz
framework to include financial frictions and show that they interact with
these costs to materially distort the patterns of trade. Furthermore, theo-
retical (Antra`s and Helpman (2004)) and empirical (Monarch et al. (2017))
work establishes the existence of similar entry costs into import markets, and
anecdotal evidence confirms that the magnitude of these costs is substantial.
For example, Lexmark International, a printer manufacturer, estimated costs
of $35-$45 million to outsource a portion of its laser printer production to
third party contractors in Mexico and China (Bronfenbrenner et al. (2001)).
Even more strikingly, Igami (2018) estimates that offshoring costs for hard
disk manufactures in the 1990s ranged into the billions of dollars. Given the
much-documented relationship between firm finances and investment, financial
frictions may very well preclude certain firms from investing in offshoring.
The second mechanism by which firm finances may impact offshoring
activities is by impairing investment incentives of foreign counter-parties. Based
11In terms of univariate correlations between financial capacity and (future) offshoring
activity, the sample of offshorers hold lower cash balances, and higher leverage ratios. How-
ever, accounting for industry drastically reduces even this univariate disparity.
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on the logic articulated in Titman (1984) and Maksimovic and Titman (1991),
both Kale and Shahrur (2007) and Banerjee et al. (2008) show that firms who
relys on strong stakeholder relationships maintain lower leverage ratios. Build-
ing up foreign production and import networks very likely requires just such
stakeholder relationships. Therefore, precariously-financed firms at the time
of PNTR’s passage are in a disadvantageous position in terms of establish-
ing and maintaining these requisite relationships. Thus, if financial frictions
impair trade response primarily via the offshoring rather than competition
channel, one should expect (weakly) larger trade-induced job losses at better
capitalized firms.
The implications for firm finances and trade liberalization should also
extend beyond manufacturing employment. If firm finances shape trade re-
sponses via the competition channel, then manufacturing employment losses
should be accompanied by market share losses as well. Additionally, competi-
tive pressures should lead to employment losses across the entire firm, not just
in manufacturing. Both of these conjectures are easily testable.
Alternatively, if firm finances shape trade responses via the offshoring
channel, then, to the extent that it is possible to measure it, we should observe
an increase in offshoring investment. Furthermore, the re-organization should
manifest in changes to their domestic operations as well. First, since firms
presumably offshore to take advantage of lower costs of production (namely
labor), offshoring of intermediate production should result in lower input costs
for domestic plants. Second, offshoring should also lead to measurable gains in
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domestic productivity. This effect occurs for two reasons. First, since low-skill
and labor intensive tasks are easier to offshore, domestic productivity may
obtain via the changing composition of domestic tasks. Second, by allowing it
to produce at a lower cost, reduced input costs act as a de-facto productivity
gain for domestic labor (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008)). I rely on
confidential production data form the U.S. Census to test these predictions.
To summarize, the existing theoretical and empirical literature leads to
the following set of hypotheses regarding the interaction between firm finances
and PNTR:
H1A: If financial frictions impair competitive resilience, poorly cap-
italized firms - those with lower cash holdings or higher leverage - should
experience larger manufacturing employment declines in response to PNTR.
H1B: If financial frictions impair competitive resilience, firms with the
largest declines in manufacturing employment declines should also experience
larger sales and aggregate employment reductions in response to PNTR.
H2A: If financial frictions impair offshoring ability, well capitalized
firms - those with higher cash holdings or lower leverage - should experience
larger manufacturing employment declines in response to PNTR.
H2B: If financial frictions impair offshoring ability, firms with the
largest manufacturing employment declines should also report increased oper-
ations in China and experience larger domestic productivity gains in response
to PNTR.
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Chapter 3
PNTR, Firm Finances, & Offshoring
3.1 Data & Empirical Strategy
3.1.1 Data Sources
3.1.1.1 Census Bureau Data
I obtain a time-series of domestic manufacturing employment using
restricted-access microdata from the U.S. Census Bureau. The longitudinal
business database (LBD) contains an annual snapshot of employment, payroll,
location, primary industry, and owning firm for virtually every establishment
with employment in the non-farm private U.S. economy.1 With this data I
calculate a time series of domestic manufacturing employment at either the
firm or plant level. The precise quantification of domestic manufacturing em-
ployment in the Census data renders it superior to employment data from
Compustat, which includes both international and non-manufacturing (e.g.
sales and administrative) workers.
I also rely on detailed production data from the Census. The quinquen-
nial Census of Manufacturers (CMF), conducted in years ending in 2 and 7,
1See Jarmin and Miranda (2002) for an overview of the LBD.
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surveys the universe of manufacturing establishments in the U.S.2 I use output
data from 1997 to construct a firm-level measure of the NTR Gap
NTRGapf =
NTRGapp ∗ wp∑
p∈f wp
Where NTRGapp is the NTR Gap for the industry of each plant p owned by
firm f and wp is the plant’s output from the 1997 CMF.
In addition, I obtain costs and quantities of the firm’s intermediate in-
puts and use this data to construct a price index of materials (see details in
Appendix B) for each industry from which the firm sources inputs. Firms pre-
sumably offshore to take advantage of lower labor costs. Therefore, firms that
offshore intermediate good production should exhibit lower material costs. I
also use capital and employment data from the CMF to calculate two other
relevant statistics. I calculate value add per employee as a measure of labor
productivity (Bernard et al. (2003)). Offshoring should increase domestic pro-
ductivity either through a reorganization towards more skill intensive tasks
or through efficiency gains at existing operations. Finally, since automation
requires significant capital investment, I collect data on machinery capital ex-
penditures from each CMF extract. I use this data to test for alternative
margins of trade adjustment. I deflate all nominal quantities using industry
price indices from Becker et al. (2013).
2I exclude from my sample any administrative records, as values for those observations
are often times imputed.
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3.1.1.2 Financial Data
I obtain firm financial information from Compustat. I match the Cen-
sus’s firm ID to Compustat identifiers using an internally-provided bridge. I
measure all financial variables as of 1999. This practice of using financial ratios
measured in advance of the shock (PNTR was ratified in October of 2000 and
went into effect in 2001) is common in the literature - see Opler and Titman
(1994), Fresard (2010), and Babina (2017). I detail variable construction in
Appendix B.
I use three proxies for financial capacity: net book leverage, net mar-
ket leverage, and cash-to-assets ratio. I use these proxies for several reasons.
First, the literature has documented a robust negative (positive) relationship
between firm leverage (cash holdings) and investment. Second, debt and cash
are commonly used as proxies for financial capacity in the international eco-
nomics literature (e.g. Manova and Yu (2016)). Finally, the financial con-
straint indices proposed by Kaplan and Zingales (1997) (as constructed in
Lamont et al. (2001)), Whited and Wu (2006), and Hadlock and Pierce (2010)
all rely on firm size in their construction. Since firm size is the primary proxy
for productivity in Melitz-style trade models, using these indices risks conflat-
ing productivity with financial capacity.
3.1.2 Offshoring Data
To measure offshoring investments in China (and other countries), I use
the text-based measure of offshoring activity compiled by Hoberg and Moon
35
(2017) and Hoberg and Moon (2018). This data is constructed by searching
10-K filings for target words such as “DISTRIBUT*”; “SHIPMENT*”; “IM-
PORT*”; “VENDOR*”; “SUPPLIER*”; “PURCHAS*”; “SUBSIDIAR*”; “PLANT*”;
“MANUFATUR*”; etc. (an “*” denotes a wild-card) within the same para-
graph as (and within 25 words of) country names. The data thus allow me to
observe firms that report substantial offshoring activity and the countries in
which it takes place. The data is available starting in 1997.
3.1.2.1 Additional Data
I obtain data on U.S. imports by destination country from the USA
Trade Online website managed by the Census Bureau. Imports at the product
level are defined using the 6- and 8-digit HS codes (HS6 and HS8 respectively).
The HS codes undergo frequent revisions. Therefore, I create a consistent
classification of products using the concordance from Pierce and Schott (2009).
I obtain country-level income data from the World Bank. I define low
income countries as all countries with per-capita gross national income (GNI)
≤ $2, 995 in 1999.3 This classification includes the low (GNI ≤ $755) and
low-middle ($756 ≤ GNI ≤ $2, 995) income groups.
I obtain industry-level data on capital and skill intensity, value add per
employee, and pre-PNTR employment and shipment growth from the NBER-
CES dataset. The data is derived from restricted Census microdata such as
3Historical classification of low income countries can be found at http://databank.
worldbank.org/data/download/site-content/OGHIST.xls.
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the CMF and and Annual Survey of Manufacturers (ASM) and is aggregated
to the industry level for public dissemination by Becker et al. (2013).
3.1.3 Sample Construction
The baseline analysis period is 1992-2007. This time frame concords
with other studies that measure the impact of Chinese trade on U.S. employ-
ment (e.g. Autor et al. (2013)). Over the course of the analysis window, the
Census switches from the standard industrial classification (SIC) system to the
North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS). This change poses
several complications. The first is that the mapping between SIC and NAICS
industries is often times many-to-many. The second, is that several industries
classified as manufacturing under SIC (such as logging) are dropped from the
manufacturing sector under NAICS. To overcome these complications, I use
the algorithm developed in Pierce and Schott (2016) which creates a consistent
set of manufacturing industries bridging across the SIC-NAICS switch.
The baseline firm level sample includes all domestic manufacturers with
available financial data. I further restrict the sample to observations with
leverage and cash-to-asset ratios on the unit interval. The plant level data
includes all manufacturing establishments whose owners comprise the firm
level sample.
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3.1.4 Empirical Design
Since PNTR represents a policy change with heterogeneous exposure,
it lends itself to a difference-in-difference analysis. To gauge the relation-
ship between financial status and firm response to PNTR, I estimate a triple-
difference regression where the coefficient of interest is the triple interaction
term between the post-PNTR time period, the NTR-gap, and measures of the
firm’s financial capacity. The baseline empirical specification is as follows
ln(Emp)f,t=θ1PostPNTRt ×NTRGapf × FCf + θ2PostPNTRt ×NTRGapf
+θ3PostPNTRt × FCf + β′1Xf × PostPNTRt ×NTRGapf
+β′2Xf × PostPNTRt + δf + δi,t + εf,t (3.1)
Where f indexes firm, i indexes industry, and t indexes year. If the regression
is properly specified, θ1 identifies the effect of firm financing on employment
responses to PNTR accounting for differences in employment growth over that
time between high and low NTR Gap firms (θ2) and financially weaker versus
strong firms (θ3). A positive (negative) sign for θ1 when financial capacity
(FCf ) is measured using leverage (cash) suggests greater post-PNTR employ-
ment losses in better capitalized firms.
In addition to my main variables of interest, I include a vector of con-
trols Xf , comprised of the firm’s pre-PNTR size, age, and employment growth.
As mentioned above, Melitz-style models yield a monotonic relationship be-
tween size and productivity. Age helps control for the life-cycle of the firm.
Finally, I include controls for pre-PNTR employment growth since employ-
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ment growth tends to generally lag at more leveraged firms (Opler and Titman
(1994)). In my robustness analysis I experiment with different specifications
for Xf , including a non-linear specification and one that allows for interac-
tions between each of the firm’s pre-PNTR characteristics. I also include a
firm fixed effect, δf , to control for any time invariant firm characteristics, and
an industry-year fixed effect, δi,t, to control for industry-level shocks. In all
of the difference-in-difference analyses that follow, I cluster standard errors at
the level of variation for the NTR Gap.
To parse out the temporal dynamics of employment responses to PNTR,
I follow Monarch et al. (2017) and divide the sample into four time periods:
1) the long-run pre-period (LR− pre 1992-1996); 2) the short-run pre-period
(SR − pre 1997-2000); 3) the short-run post-period (SR − post 2001-2004);
and 4) the long-run post-period (LR − post 2005-2007). I then estimate the
following regression
ln(Emp)f,t=
∑
k∈K
[
θ1,k1{t ∈ k} ×NTRGapf × FCf + θ2,k1{t ∈ k} ×NTRGapf
+θ3,k1{t ∈ k} × FCf + β′1,kXf × 1{t ∈ k} ×NTRGapf
+β′2,kXf × 1{t ∈ k}
]
+ δf + δi,t + εf,t (3.2)
Where K ≡ {LR−pre, SR−post, LR−post} leaving SR−pre as the reference
category. In this specification, θ1,LR−pre tests for pre-period parallelism and
θ1,SR−post and θ1,LR−post measure the relative sort-term and longer-term post-
PNTR responses respectively. The remaining controls and fixed effects are the
same as in (3.1).
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3.1.5 PNTR & Manufacturing Employment - Baseline Results
I begin with a simple graphical representation of the baseline tests.
Panel (a) of Figure 3.1 reports the average percentage change in domestic
manufacturing employment for firm above and below the sample median of
NTRGapf . As Pierce and Schott (2016) show, employment drops much more
precipitously for firms operating in industries more exposed to the PNTR pol-
icy. Comparing the growth rates across the two subsamples yields a difference
in difference estimate of the Policy’s effect of about 10.2%. In panel (b) ((c)) of
Figure 3.1, I further break the high and low NTRGapf groups into firms with
book leverage (cash) ratios above and below their industry’s median ratio. As
the figures show, in the high NTRGapf group, firms who were better capital-
ized at the time of PNTR’s passage, i.e. those with lower leverage or high cash
balances, exhibit 6.5%-8.3% larger employment declines. This result contrasts
with the low NTRGapf sample, where better capitalized firms exhibit smaller
job losses. Comparing the difference between poorly and well capitalized firms
in the high and low NTRGapf groups yields a triple difference estimate of the
interaction between firm financing and PNTR on the order of about 11%.4
Next, I present the results from estimating (3.1) in Table 3.1. In column
(1) I estimate the difference in difference effect without conditioning on firm
finances and find that higher NTR Gaps lead to lower post-PNTR employment.
Importantly, I find a statistically and economically meaningful relationship
4In compliance with the Census confidential disclosure policy, I do not report the results
for net market leverage, which are qualitatively similar.
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between a firm’s pre-PNTR financial standing and its response to the policy.
The positive and significant θ1 coefficient in the leverage regressions (columns
(2) and (3) of Table 3.1) suggests that firms with lower leverage ratios relative
to their industry peers also exhibit greater PNTR-induced employment losses.
Specifically, a 10% decrease in leverage is associated with employment losses
that are 22%-29% more sensitive to changes in the NTR Gap.5 The negative
and significant coefficient for θ1 in column (4) suggests that likewise, a 5%
increase in a firm’s cash holdings is associated with an average amplification
of 57% of the unconditional effect of the NTR gap on employment losses. These
findings indicate that the results in Figure 3.1 are robust to controlling for firm
size and age, employment pre-trends, unobserved inter-industry heterogeneity,
and firm fixed effects.
In Figure 3.2, I explore the dynamics of this relationship. The coeffi-
cient θ1,LR−Pre is insignificant and positive (negative) in the leverage (cash)
specification, allowing me to further rule out any contaminating pre-trends.
The Figure further shows a significant reduction in employment in the SR −
Post period that remains persistent, albeit statistically insignificantly so, over
the longer horizon as well.
5These estimates are generated by multiplying the coefficient on net book (market) lever-
age by 10% and then comparing it to the unconditional effect of the PNTR policy. For
example, for net book leverage, the estimate is −2.26∗−0.1−0.78 = 0.29.
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3.1.6 PNTR & Manufacturing Employment - Additional Tests
I conduct several robustness tests, which I report in Table 3.2. First, I
confirm that results are robust to sales (column (1)) and assets (column (2)) as
the measure of firm size. Second, rather than calculating individual NTR Gaps
for each firms, I force all firms with primary employment in the same industry
to have the same NTR gap (column (3)). Finally, I measure PNTR exposure
via just the non-NTR rates rather than the NTR Gap (column (4)). This
last test forces variation in PNTR exposure to come from the more plausibly
exogenous Smoot-Hawley tarrif rates. I present the robustness tests in Table
3.2 and find no material qualitative or quantitative change in the results. The
θ1 coefficients are consistently significant and of a similar magnitude to the
baseline results in all of the robustness tests.
In addition to firm level regressions, I also take advantage of the gran-
ularity of the Census microdata and estimate the employment regression at
the plant level. Specifically, I run the following regression
ln(Emp)f,p,t=θ1PostPNTRt ×NTRGapp × FCf + θ2PostPNTRt × FCf
+δp + δc,i,t + εf,p,t (3.3)
Here f indexes the firm, p indexes the plant, t the year, and i indicates
the plant’s industry. In this specification, rather than include continuous mea-
sures of the controls in Xf , I include indicators for the decile of the firm’s
size and pre-PNTR growth rate and whether or not it is above the median
age in the sample. The fixed effect δc,i,t represents the interaction of each of
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the firm characteristic bins with each other as well as the plant’s industry and
the current year. Owing to δc,i,t, this specification forces the comparison to
occur between two plants operating in the same industry (i.e. same NTR Gap)
and owned by firms of similar size, age, and pre-PNTR employment growth
rates. Therefore, the regression generates estimates on based on variation in
employment outcomes between narrowly defined groups of plants and provides
evidence of adjustments across intensive margins of employment.
To capture plant-level adjustments along the extensive margin as well,
I conduct two additional tests. First, following Davis et al. (1996), I calculate
the symmetric growth rate from the pre to post-PNTR periods
∆{Empp} ≡ Empp,post − Empp,pre
.5(Empp,post + Empp,pre)
As Davis et al. (1996) show, this growth rate approximates log changes in
employment with the added benefit of accommodating plant closures (i.e.
Emppost = 0). I also define 1{Deathp} as an indicator of plant closure in
the post-PNTR analysis window. I then estimate the following regressions
1{Deathp}=θ1NTRGapp × FCf + θ2FCf + δf,i + εp (3.4)
∆{Empp}=θ1NTRGapp × FCf + θ2FCf + δf,i + εp (3.5)
I report the results from estimating (3.3)-(3.4) using net book leverage, net
market leverage, and cash in panels A and B of Table 3.3 respectively. The
plant-level tests conform with the takeaways from the firm-level regressions.
Firms with 10% less leverage on average have PNTR-induced employment
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reductions that are 33%-36% (columns (2) and (3) of panel B) larger than the
unconditional effect (from column (1)). Better capitalized firms are also, on
average, 20%-70% more likely to close plants in higher NTR Gap industries
(columns (5) through (8) in Panel B).6
3.1.7 Identification Concerns
The identifying assumption behind an economic (i.e. causal) relation-
ship between firm finances and trade responses is that firm financial ratios,
measured two years prior to PNTR, are uncorrelated with any other unob-
served factor that would lead more exposed firms to shed employment in the
policy’s wake. As mentioned in the introduction, this type of “clean” variation
should exist in my sample of mature manufacturing firms, but absent a way to
isolate it, ruling alternative explanations in general is difficult. In this section I
address several specific identification concerns and present cross-sectional tests
that help rule out numbers alternative explanations.
3.1.7.1 Reverse Causality
The post-PNTR period coincides with the time-frame immediately fol-
lowing China’s long-awaited WTO ascension. Furthermore, corporate lobbying
in favor of PNTR (see Section 3.1.9) rouses suspicions that firms supporting
the bill were poised to invest in offshoring regardless of its passage and had
6Due to loss of power from sample restrictions needed to comply with Census disclo-
sure policy, the coefficient for plant closures is not significant in the leverage specifications.
Regressions on the unrestricted sample yield significant estimates.
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structured their finances accordingly. This reverse causality would invalidate
the analysis only if the firms poised to offshore regardless of PNTR were sys-
tematically operating in higher NTR Gap industries. Since the NTR Gap is
largely driven by variations in non-NTR rates, which were set in the 1930s,
it is plausibly orthogonal to current determinants of offshoring. Addition-
ally, as Pierce and Schott (2016) show, high NTR Gap industries in Europe,
which was unaffected by PNTR’s passage, do not experience larger employ-
ment drops in the post-NTR period. This evidence alleviates concerns that
some unobserved industry characteristics correlated with the NTR Gap also
drive offshoring decisions. Furthermore, as 2.2 reports, there is no significant
relationship between the NTR Gap and pre-PNTR employment or import
growth. Since unconditional import penetration and manufacturing employ-
ment declines preceded PNTR, the lack of pre-trends helps mitigate reverse
causality issues.
I conduct two further tests to rule out reverse causality due to China’s
anticipated WTO entry more definitively. First, I instrument leverage ratios
from 1999 with their 1994 levels and find qualitatively similar results (results
unreported). Second, I reestimate (3.1) after excluding firms whose 1999 finan-
cial ratios may reflect adjustments for future offshoring plans. On November
15, 1999 China and the U.S. entered into a bilateral trade agreement seen as
paving the way to China’s WTO entry (see Chapter 2.2). This agreement
was unexpected as it was the product of tense negotiations which were offi-
cially called off prior to the agreement being signed (Devereaux and Lawrence
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(2004)). Furthermore, as previous negotiations regarding China’s WTO as-
cendancy had stalled, it is unlikely that firm could predict the success of the
November talks. It is therefore likely that firm finances measured prior, or
shortly after, this agreement are not affected by any future considerations per-
taining to China’s entry into the WTO. However, firms with fiscal years ending
several months after the agreement do have time to begin adjusting financial
policy. In unreported tests, I exclude from my sample all firms whose fiscal
year ended after December 31, 1999 and find similar results.
As Table 2.2 further shows, the NTR Gap is also negatively correlated
with firm size (columns (7) - (9)) age (column (10)) and operating margins
(columns (11) and (12)).7 This relationship raises the question of whether
firms in higher NTR Gap industries are fundamentally less able to withstand
increased competition from China. I address whether my results are driven by
economic distress, along with additional concerns, below.
3.1.7.2 Alternative Mechanisms
Even if reverse causality concerns are addressed, a second, potentially
more pernicious issue remains. It is possible that other factors simultaneously
govern both firm finances and employment responses to PNTR. Ruling out
this concern in general requires “clean” variation in firm finances. Without
such variation, the best one can do is identify and address the most immediate
7Given the size discrepancy, it is unsurprising that the NTR Gap is also negatively
correlated with leverage, and positively correlated with higher cash balances (columns (16)
through (18)).
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manifestations of this omitted variable issue. To that end, I focus on the
following alternative explanations.
The first alternative is that precariously capitalized firms are also eco-
nomically distressed. These firms would likely forgo offshoring investment even
absent financial frictions. The second alternative is that the results obtain due
to differences in capital intensities between firms. Capital intense firms tend
to hold more leverage (Titman and Wessels (1988)) and less cash (Fresard
(2010)). Since the primary benefit of offshoring to China is access to cheap
and ample labor, more capital intense firms may have less incentive to do so.
The third alternative is that the results obtain due to differences in financial
resources between multinational and strictly domestic companies. Multina-
tional companies (MNCs) are presumably better positioned to take advantage
of an improved offshoring environment, having already established interna-
tional operations. A spurious relation will arise if MNCs also have higher cash
holdings or lower leverage.
To rule out these specific concerns, I reestimate (3.1), augmenting Xf
with controls for proxies for firm fundamentals, capital intensity, and multi-
national operations. I use return on assets (ROA), net profit margin (NPM),
market to book (M2B) ratio, total factor productivity (TFP), and value add
per employee as proxies for fundamentals (i.e. economic distress). I measure
ROA, NPM, and M2B as of the firm’s 1999 financial year end. I measure the
firm’s TFP and value add per employee from the 1997 CMF. As proxies for
capital intensity, I use the firm’s ratio of tangible assets, also measured as of
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1999, as well as its capital-to-labor ratio from the 1997 CMF. Finally, I con-
struct an indicator of whether the firm reports multiple geographic segments
or income from foreign operations as proxies for multinational operations. I
report the results incorporating additional controls in Table 3.4. As the anal-
ysis shows, the baseline results are robust to the alternative explanations, as
measured by my proxies. Of course, since I cannot capture all potential unob-
servables and alternative explanations, this analysis is admittedly imperfect.
However, the consistent resilience of the θ1 coefficients in the face of additional
controls instills confidence in the validity of the estimates.
3.1.7.3 Cross-Sectional Evidence
Another alternative to mitigating the omitted variable concern is to use
plausibly exogenous inter-industry variation to relax the identifying assump-
tion. One relevant cross-sectional split is the firm’s level of external financial
dependence (EFD). Rajan and Zingales (1998) argue variation in EFD occurs
due to cross-industry differences in “initial project scale, the gestation period,
the cash harvest period, and the requirement for continuing investment...” (p.
563). As such, it could interact with firm finances to exacerbate the underin-
vestment problem in two ways. Firstly, if EFD is driven by the project’s scale
(i.e larger amounts of financing needs), then collateral constraints (or other
borrowing constraints such as covenants) may prevent more poorly capital-
ized and highly dependent firms from obtaining sufficient financing. Secondly,
capital intensive projects with long project gestation and cash harvest periods
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likely also require significant relationship-specific investment by foreign part-
ners. This specificity may exacerbate any stakeholder disincentives created by
poor firm capitalization.
Ideally, EFD captures only differences in the dependence on external
sources of capital. In practice, such differences are often a product of the
complexity of the manufacturing process. Consequently, high-tech industries
such as pharmaceutical and computing manufacturing are also high-EFD while
low-tech industries such as apparel manufacturing tend to be low-EFD. To the
extent that high-tech industries are less likely candidates for offshoring, these
differences should bias the results against my proposed channel. Furthermore,
as long as the relationship between financial position and any other relevant
unobservable (e.g. productivity) does not depend on a firm’s degree of EFD,
then a more acute employment response in the high-dependence subsample
would be strongly suggestive of the financing channel. That is, by comparing
the θ1 coefficient across the two subsamples I no longer require well and poorly
capitalized firms to exhibit no other unobservable differences. Rather, the
assumption becomes that any difference in unobservables that is correlated
with strength of balance sheet does not vary across the high and low EFD
subsamples.
The classical Rajan and Zingales (1998) measure of EFD is the ratio of
investment that cannot be funded by operating cash-flow.
EFD =
INV EST −OCF
INV EST
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Following the standard methodology, I calculate the firm-level EFD by sum-
ming all investment (Compustat CAPEX) and operating cash-flows from 1992-
1999. I then define the industry-level EFD as the median firm-level EFD in
the industry. I use only single-segment firms in this calculation. I first take the
median EFD for each 3-digit SIC industry and then merge that to the 3-digit
SIC of each firm’s industry segment from Compustat. I then calculate the firm
level EFD in a similar manner to the firm level NTR Gap, by weighting each
industry’s EFD by its sales.
EFDf =
EFDi ∗ wi∑
i∈f wi
I divide the baseline sample into high versus low EFD firms and present the
results in Table 3.5. Firm financing has no material effect on post-PNTR
employment outcomes for the low-EFD group. However firms with 10% less
leverage in the high-EFD group reduce employment between 4% for each 10%
increase in NTR gap (coefficient in column (1) ×0.012), a statistically and
economically different response. Similar results hold when examining cash
balances. Firms in the high-EFD sample with 5% more cash on hand reduce
employment by about 3% more for each 10% increase in the NTR gap (6.2
× 0.05 × 0.1). This increased sensitivity is economically significant consid-
ering that unconditionally a 10% increase in the gap leads to a 7% (-0.705
× 0.1) drop in employment for high-EFD firms. Furthermore, the effect is
statistically different from the relationship between cash balances and post-
PNTR job losses for low-EFD firms. The analysis therefore confirms my re-
sults are robust to relaxing the identifying assumption in the manner described
50
above. Caveats notwithstanding, the tests examining domestic manufactur-
ing employment present evidence uniformly consistent with financial frictions
preventing certain firms from offshoring operations in the wake of PNTR.
3.1.8 Additional Evidence
In this section, I look beyond employment outcomes and examine ad-
ditional firm outcomes that are consistent with either the competition or off-
shoring mechanism. My findings present a mosaic of evidence in favor of better
capitalized firms offshoring operations as a result of PNTR.
I begin by examining PNTR-related issuance of debt and equity. The
inherent logic in the above analysis is that firms with less leverage and/or
more cash are more easily able to marshal external (or rely on internal) re-
sources to finance offshoring investments. One should therefore expect that
better capitalized firms “draw down” on their financial capacity after PNTR
is passed. To verify this argument, I re-estimate (3.1) using debt and equity
issuance as the outcome variables and present the results in Table 3.6. I re-
port the results for debt issuance in Panel A. In Columns (1)-(3), I check
whether conditioning issuance activity on ex-ante financing is associated with
increased debt issuance. The estimates on the triple interaction coefficient
θ1 suggest that ex-ante better capitalized firms do indeed issue more debt in
response to PNTR. A one standard deviation reduction in leverage is asso-
ciated with increased post-PNTR debt issuance of between 4-7% relative to
the pre-PNTR period (Columns (2) and (3) ). A standard deviation increase
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in cash holdings is associated with increased post-PNTR debt issuance of be-
tween 11% relative to the pre-PNTR period (Column (4)). As Giroud and
Mueller (2017) argue, these debt issuance results are consistent with ex-ante
less levered and cash-rich firms drawing down on the debt capacity once new
investment opportunities arise.
I look at equity issuance in Panel B. If offshoring opportunities are
sufficiently lucrative, firms with exhausted debt capacity may try to issue
additional equity to finance their investment. The results in Panel B are
consistent with this hypothesis. I find at least some evidence that more levered
firms increase equity issuance in response to the shock. A standard deviation
increase in net book (market) leverage is associated with increased equity
issuance of about 7% (3%).8
I next proceed in testing hypothesis 1B. To do so, I use Compustat
data on sales and company-wide employment. If better capitalized firms shed
more workers due to larger (relative) market share losses, they should also
exhibit (relatively) larger declines in sales. To test this prediction, I estimate
the following regression
ln(Sale)f,i,t=θ1PostPNTRt ×NTRGapf × FCf + θ2PostPNTRt × FCf
+β′1Xf × PostPNTRt ×NTRGapf + β′2Xf × PostPNTRt
+δf + δi,t + εf,t (3.6)
8If issuance costs for equity are higher than those for debt and offshoring exhibits de-
creasing returns to scale, then firms with unused debt capacity should be able to engage in
greater offshoring investment than those forced to issue equity.
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The unit of observation is the natural log of sales from each industry
segment i operated by firm f in year t. The coefficient on the interaction
between the NTR Gap and the post PNTR period is subsumed by the industry-
year dummy δi,t. The remaining controls are the same as in (3.1) except they
are all sourced from Compustat. The results from this exercise, summarized in
Panel A of Table 3.8, are inconsistent with the market share loss hypothesis.
Unconditionally, the NTR Gap is not associated with sales declines (column
(1)). Conditioning on firm finances further dispels the notion that job losses
materialize due to competition. The coefficients in columns (2) and (4) suggest
that if anything, high NTR Gap firms with less book leverage (more cash)
at the time of PNTR exhibit relatively larger sales growth post-PNTR. The
coefficient in column (3) is positive, but this effect is small and insignificant.
In un-tabulated tests, I repeat the analysis using aggregate firm rather than
segment sales. While PNTR is unconditionally negatively related to firm sales
in this specification, I still find no evidence of more prominent market share
losses for better capitalized firms.
Similarly, if the more pronounced manufacturing job losses are a prod-
uct of downscaling, rather than adjusting away from domestic labor, one
should observe similar declines in the firm’s non-domestic-manufacturing em-
ployment. To test this prediction I re-estimate (3.6) using Compustat data
on industry segment employment. I report the results in Panel B of Table
3.8. As with sales, the unconditional relationship between PNTR, firm fi-
nances, and employment becomes statistically insignificant, and economically
53
much less relevant, when aggregate, not just manufacturing, employment is
the outcome variable (column (1)). This fact holds true for each of the triple
interaction terms in columns (2)-(4). These results, in conjunction with the
manufacturing employment results from Tables 3.1-3.5, suggest that firms are
substituting away from domestic manufacturing rather than instituting across
the board cuts.
I next turn to tests of hypothesis 2B. I first check for evidence that
better capitalized firms complement domestic manufacturing employment re-
ductions with offshoring investment in China. This exercise is complicated by
the fact that readily available investment data from Compustat usually comes
at the aggregate level. Additionally, firms who outsource to third party man-
ufacturers or engage in joint ventures may not report this activity directly in
financial statements. To overcome this challenge, I rely on data of reported
offshoring activity from the body of firms’ 10-K filings. This data comes from
collected Hoberg and Moon (2017) and Hoberg and Moon (2017) and I use it
to estimate the following regression
1{Offshore}xf,t=θ1PostPNTRt ×NTRGapi × FCf
+θ2PostPNTRt ×NTRGapi
+θ3PostPNTRt × FCf
+β′1Xf × PostPNTRt ×NTRGapi
+β′2Xf × PostPNTRt + δf + δi,p + εf,t (3.7)
Where 1{Offshore}xf,t is an indicator that firm f reports offshore operations
in country x during year t and x ∈ {China,ROW}. Along with the control
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set Xf , I also include firm (δf ) and industry-period (δi,p where p ∈ {Pre −
PNTR,Post−PNTR}) fixed effects. Under the offshoring hypothesis, higher
NTR Gap firms should see increased reporting in offshored Chinese operations
after PNTR is passed. Furthermore a negative (positive) coefficient for θ1 is
consistent with less levered (cash rich) firms undertaking these investments at
even higher frequencies. I report the results of this analysis in Table 3.7. The
first row of Table 3.7 shows that unconditionally, a 10% increase in NTR Gap
leads to about 1.3% higher likelihood of reporting offshored operations in China
in the post-PNTR period (column (1)). This effect represents an increase of
about 5% relative to the pre-PNTR probability of 27.2%. Examining the θ1
coefficient in column (1) shows that a 10% reductions in leverage is associated
a further 0.98%-1.46% increase in offshoring likelihood. While the estimate
for cash holdings is smaller and statistically insignificant, overall the results
are consistent with better capitalized firms shedding domestic employment in
favor of offshored production to China. In column (2) I check whether PNTR,
and its interaction with firm finances, is associated with increased offshoring
outside of China. The coefficients for those regressions are all statistically
insignificant and the sign suggests that if anything, in the post-PNTR period,
firms substitute away from other foreign countries towards China. Finally, in
column (3) I test whether the differential offshoring response to China versus
the rest of the world (ROW) is statistically different. I find this to be the case
for all instances except for the regression using pre-PNTR cash holdings as a
measure of financial capacity.
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I next examine the connection between PNTR, offshoring, and input
costs. Figure 3.3 shows that unconditionally, industries with higher upstream
exposure to PNTR, i.e. those with higher NTR Gap inputs, exhibit a sharp
drop in materials cost in the post-PNTR period. To test if these cost sav-
ings concentrate in better capitalized firms, I use input-cost data from the
quinquennial CMF survey and estimate the following regression
ln(Matcost)f,i,t=θ1PostPNTRt ×NTRGapi × FCf
+θ2PostPNTRt ×NTRGapi
+θ3PostPNTRt × FCf + β′1Xf × PostPNTRt ×NTRGapi
+β′2Xf × PostPNTRt + δf,i + δf,p + εf,t (3.8)
The unit of observation ln(Matcost)f,i,t is the price index (i.e. total costs
divided by total quantities) for each firm’s f input industry i in 1992, 1997,
2002, and 2007. Along with the control set Xf , I also include segment (δf,i) and
industry-period (δf,p where p ∈ {Pre−PNTR,Post−PNTR}) fixed effects.
I report the results in panel A of Table 3.9 The positive (negative) sign for
θ1 in the leverage (cash) regressions indicates that for each 10% increase in
the NTR Gap of an input industry, better capitalized firms are able to reduce
material costs by 1.5%-8.5%.
To test whether offshoring leads to measurable gains in domestic pro-
ductivity, I reestimate (3.8) with LaborProd (value add per employee) as the
dependent variable. Figure 3.4 shows that the unconditionally, higher NTR
Gap industries experience a small yet significant increase in labor productiv-
ity. I report the results conditioning on firm finances in panel B of Table
56
3.9. The unit of observation is the value add per employee for each domestic
manufacturing industry the firm operates. The negative (postive) sign for θ1
in the leverage (cash) regressions indicate that better capitalized firms realize
significant productivity gains along the order of 1% for each 10% increase in
the NTR Gap.
Finally, firms may respond to Chinese competition by investing in labor-
saving technology (automation). Since the CMF data provide explicit break-
outs of domestic capital expenditures for machinery, I re-estimate (3.8) using
machinery outlays (MachCapex) as the outcome variable and report the re-
sult in panel C of Table 3.9. I find no meaningful relationship between the
NTR Gap, firm finances, and investment in machinery.
3.1.9 Effects of PNTR on U.S. Economy
I close the analysis by relating my findings to the broader question
of the effects of trade liberalization on the U.S. economy. Specifically, I ask
whether firms view offshoring as a desirable benefit of, rather than a necessary
response to, PNTR. Anecdotal evidence (see Chapter 2.2) squares much more
neatly with the former interpretation. The strong support for and warm cor-
porate reception of PNTR’s passage is incongruent with the notion that firms
viewed the policy as facilitating more intense competition. In addition, the
positive market reaction to PNTR-related news (See Table 2.3) is consistent
with markets anticipating that firms will take advantage of new offshoring
investment opportunities and cheaper labor abroad.
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To complement these findings, I present evidence consistent with for-
eign investment serving as a driver of the post-PNTR growth in Chinese im-
ports. Figure 3.5 graphs the annual flows of foreign direct investment (FDI)
into China from 1995-2006. Aggregate FDI in China grew from about $80 bil-
lion in 1995 to around $200 billion in 2006. Furthermore, the composition of
FDI shifted from investment in joint ventures to the establishment of foreign-
owned entities (i.e. foreign subsidiaries) starting in 2000, the year of PNTR’s
passage. Figure 3.6 graphs the percentage of total U.S. imports sourced from
China (blue series) and the percentage Chinese imports sourced from a related
party from 1992-2007. Importantly, the Figure shows that as China’s share
of the U.S. import market grows, more of those imports come from a related
party - that is a foreign subsidiary. Taken together, Figures 3.5 and 3.6 sug-
gest that the investment surge occurring around the time of PNTR’s passage
(and China’s WTO entry) may help explain a material part of China’s import
growth.
Systematic evidence of the effects of FDI on PNTR-induced import
growth further confirms this hypothesis. Using Chinese microdata, Pierce
and Schott (2016) show that the strongest response in PNTR-related export
growth, both economically and statistically, comes from foreign owned firms
operating in China. This fact underscores the necessity of foreign invest-
ment for Chinese import growth. To complement their analysis, I investigate
whether regulatory restrictions on FDI dampen the relationship between the
NTR Gap and Chinese imports. Evidence that with FDI restrictions, the NTR
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Gap is unrelated to import growth speaks to the essential role that foreign in-
vestment plays in spurring Chinese import growth.
I implement my tests using data on FDI regulations by the Chinese
Government. The Chinese Ministry of Commerce periodically releases a Guid-
ance Catalog for Foreign Direct Investment.9 This catalog divides foreign in-
vestment categories into four groups: prohibited, restricted, permitted, and
encouraged. The catalog explicitly lists only prohibited, restricted, and en-
couraged investments. All other projects are presumed to be permitted. In-
vestment in restricted projects is subject to strict governmental examination,
case-by-case approval, and may be limited to joint ventures under which the
Chinese partner shall hold majority interests. Permitted projects do not re-
quire special approval and face no ownership limitations. Encouraged projects
provide additional incentives such as tax breaks. I use the mapping from
Blonigen and Ma (2010) to link the catalog categories to HS6 product codes.
I focus on the restricted and permitted categories only because the prohibited
category is limited to a small set of projects such as ivory carving and herbal
medicines, and as I discuss below, projects in the encouraged category are
less likely to be FDI targets. Since disaggregated data on FDI is not readily
available, I use these regulatory restrictions on FDI as a proxy for reduced
FDI flows.10
9See Davies and Balve-Hauff (2003) for more information.
10The BEA provides restricted-use microdata on Chinese subsidiaries of U.S. multination-
als. However, that data cannot be used in conjunction with Census microdata on domestic
activities.
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Using UTO data on U.S. imports from China from 1997-2004 (when
the Chinese Ministry of Commerce released another revision of the catalog), I
estimate the following regression separately for products in the restricted and
permitted categories
ln(V al)p,t =
2004∑
k=1998
θk1{k = t} ×NTRGapp + δp + δt + εp,t (3.9)
Where ln(V al) is the natural logarithm of Chinese imports and δp and δt
represent product and year fixed effects respectively. I graph the θk coefficients
(with 1997 as the reference year) in Figure 3.7. Restricted products (panel (a))
with higher NTR Gap do not experience higher Chinese import growth rates in
the post-PNTR period, while import growth is significantly related to the NTR
Gap in permitted products (panel (b)).11 To verify that these differences are
statistically significant I estimate the following diff-in-diff and triple difference
regressions
ln(V al)p,t=θ1PostPNTRt ×NTRGapp + δp + δt + εp,t (3.10)
ln(V al)p,t=θ1PostPNTRt ×NTRGapp
+θ21{c = Per} × PostPNTRt ×NTRGapp
+δp + δc,t + εp,c,t (3.11)
I estimate (3.10) for the the entire sample as well as for the restricted
and permitted subsamples separately. I report the results in Table 3.10. A
10% increase in the NTR Gap is associated with 4.3% larger Chinese import
11Consistent with all other tests, I use 2001-2004 as the post period in this analysis, the
results are qualitatively similar if I use 2002-2004.
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growth in the full sample (column (1)). For permitted projects (column (2)),
the growth rate is 4.8%, while it is negative and insignificant for restricted
projects (column (3)). The triple difference results (column (4) in Panel A of
Table 3.10) indicate that this difference is significant at the 10% level. These
findings are consistent with foreign investment playing a significant role in the
China’s post-PNTR export growth.
An important caveat to the analysis above is that the investment guide-
lines are not exogenous. However, a plausible argument exists as to why
OLS estimates understate the effects of FDI restrictions on import growth
in restricted products. A casual inspection of the Catalog suggests that
China encourages investment in higher technology manufacturing fields and
restricts it in lower technology markets (see for example Appendix Table 3.11).
Lower technology manufacturing is arguably better suited to take advantage
of China’s large, cheap, and (relative to the U.S.) unskilled labor force. Un-
der this argument, the low-technology restricted projects are actually a better
natural fit for the legal and economic environment in China. This logic then
suggests that the estimation of θ2 in (3.11) understates the dampening ef-
fect of regulatory investment restrictions. A similar argument regarding the
higher technology manufacturing found in the encouraged category suggests
FDI flows may lag in those projects despite the investment incentives.12
12The difference in difference coefficient for (3.10) is positive yet insignificant in the en-
couraged sub-sample. The results do not materially change if I include encouraged projects
in the full sample and triple difference regression.
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To test for the existence of systematic differences in the natural fit
of investment for permitted and restricted projects, I calculate the percent-
age of total U.S. imports that originate from lower-income countries (exclud-
ing China) in 2000. Schott (2008) shows that China’s factor endowments,
e.g. skilled labor and capital, most closely resemble those of other develop-
ing economies. The classical Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) model predicts that with
global trade markets, each country concentrates production in products whose
factor intensities match most closely with the country’s factor endowments.
HO models therefore suggest that if lower income countries, including China,
are endowed with labor forces more suitable for low-technology manufactur-
ing (relative to the U.S. and other developed economies), then they should
account for a larger share of U.S. imports in those products. I present the re-
sults of this hypothesis in column (1) of Panel B of Table 3.10. 13.3% of U.S.
imports for restricted products are sourced from other low-income countries in
2000. That same ratio is about 9.6% for permitted products.13 This difference
is both economically and statistically significant and suggests that restricted
projects do indeed exhibit a natural advantage for Chinese production relative
to permitted projects. The insignificant association between the NTR Gap
and import growth in the restricted category therefore speaks to the material
role that FDI plays in promoting post-PNTR imports.
As additional validation, I also check for differences in country “HHI”
13Encouraged products have an even lower share of lower-income sourcing than permitted
projects.
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between permitted and restricted projects. I calculate country “HHI” using
the same sum-of-squared-shares methodology as traditional HHI calculations,
but using country share of total imports. These indices don’t measure com-
petition or concentration in the traditional sense, but are still useful for ex-
amining whether significant differences in product markets exists across the
two investment categories. For example, if one category of products exhibits
a significantly higher concentration of importing countries, it is possible that
production in those markets concentrates in a certain region due to some nat-
ural advantage. Likewise, significant differences in dispersion across categories
may be indicative of more competition. Therefore, it is comforting, as column
(2) in Panel B of Table 3.10 shows, that no significant difference in importing
country “HHI” exist across the categories.
The favorable corporate and market reception of PNTR’s passage, as
well as the connection between FDI allowances and the growth in Chinese
imports attributable to the policy, paint a picture in which investment oppor-
tunities, rather than import competition, play a primary role in determining
outcomes for domestic firms and product markets. These results, in conjunc-
tion with the evidence regarding offshoring and employment outcomes, shed
new light on how the U.S. economy adjusts to freer trade with China.
3.2 Discussion & Conclusion
In this final section, I include a discussion of how my results compare to
recent research examining the competitive effects of Chinese trade and provide
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concluding remarks.
3.2.1 Relation to Previous Literature
Recent papers also examine how Chinese trade impacts domestic firms
and employment. Both Autor et al. (2016a) and Hombert and Matray (2018)
argue that increased competition from Chinese producers erodes firm prof-
itability leading to decreased investments in innovation and employment losses.
There are several reasons why my results point in a different direction. First
and foremost, the primary identification strategy of trade effects used by
these two papers relies on reform-induced productivity growth stemming from
China’s transition into a market economy, while my analysis focuses on re-
ductions in trade barriers. Trade liberalization is plausibly more of a shock
to investment opportunities than the increased competitiveness of the Chinese
manufacturing sector. In the extreme, consider a developing country with a
large, idle labor force but no real organizational (or entrepreneurial) capital to
utilize it. A reduction in trade costs with said country should not matter ab-
sent any foreign investment to establish a manufacturing sector. On the other
hand, even if trade costs remain the same, as the developing nation becomes
more market-oriented, it is likely to spur new ventures that will compete with
producers in developed countries.
It is also possible to interpret the primary findings in Autor et al.
(2016a) and Hombert and Matray (2018) within the context of offshoring.
Autor et al. (2016a) show that firms in industries with larger Chinese import
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penetration rates reduce their innovation investments. However, Bena and
Simintzi (2017) show that cheap foreign labor is a substitute for process inno-
vations. Likewise, the result in Hombert and Matray (2018) that firms with
a higher stock of R&D experience smaller trade-induced employment declines
can be attributed to said firms being less willing to offshore production, e.g.
due to concerns of intellectual property theft.
3.2.2 Conclusion
In this dissertation, I empirically examine the relationship between firm
finances and responses to PNTR - a landmark reduction of Chinese-U.S. trade
barriers. I document that better capitalized firms exhibit larger manufacturing
employment declines in response to liberalized trade with China and connect
this result to offshoring. While caveats regarding a causal link remain, I con-
duct a litany of tests that are all consistent with financial capacity determining
firms’ ability to invest in offshoring.
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Table 2.1: Highest and Lowest NTR Gap Industries
Highest NTR Gap Industries
Industry NTR Non-NTR NTR Gap
Blank Magnetic and Optical Recording Media Manufacturing 0.000 0.800 0.800
Plastics Bottle Manufacturing 0.030 0.800 0.770
Toilet Preparation Manufacturing 0.015 0.748 0.732
Other Knit Fabric and Lace Mills 0.105 0.834 0.729
Cigarette Manufacturing 0.074 0.745 0.671
Other Hosiery and Sock Mills 0.145 0.803 0.658
Doll and Stuffed Toy Manufacturing 0.002 0.638 0.637
Game, Toy, and Children’s Vehicle Manufacturing 0.002 0.638 0.637
Totalizing Fluid Meter and Counting Device Manufacturing 0.026 0.653 0.626
Schiﬄi Machine Embroidery 0.056 0.672 0.616
Lowest NTR Gap Industries
Industry NTR Non-NTR NTR Gap
Phosphatic Fertilizer Manufacturing 0.001 0.004 0.003
Malt Manufacturing 0.010 0.025 0.015
Pulp Mills 0.002 0.020 0.019
Cement Manufacturing 0.000 0.026 0.026
Farm Machinery and Equipment Manufacturing 0.001 0.034 0.033
Petroleum Refineries 0.012 0.048 0.036
Wood Preservation 0.003 0.048 0.045
Bottled Water Manufacturing 0.003 0.049 0.046
Ice Manufacturing 0.003 0.049 0.046
Soft Drink Manufacturing 0.003 0.049 0.046
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Table 2.3: Event Study
This table presents cross-sectional regressions of event returns for the Novem-
ber 15, 1999 China-US bilateral deal (columns (1) and (4)), May 25, 2000
PNTR vote (columns (2) and (5)), and their sum (columns (3) and (6)).
NTRGapf is the NTR gap based on the firm’s industry code in Compustat.
Abnormal returns are the stock’s excess return over the CRSP Value-weighted
market return. Columns (1)-(3) present day-of abnormal returns and columns
(4)-(6) present CAR over the [-1,10] window. Standard errors clustered at the
industry level are included in parenthesis. *** indicates significance at 1%
level, ** indicates 5%, and * indicates 10%.
AR[Day Of] CAR[-1,10]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Event= 11/15/99 5/25/00 Sum 11/15/99 5/25/00 Sum
NTRGapf 0.022*** 0.023* 0.045*** 0.237*** 0.127*** 0.364***
(0.008) (0.013) (0.014) (0.061) (0.044) (0.096)
Constant 0.000 0.003 0.003 -0.064*** 0.007 -0.058*
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.022) (0.014) (0.032)
N 1,977 1,977 1,977 1,977 1,977 1,977
adj. R2 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.014 0.002 0.012
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Table 2.4: PNTR and Implied Volatility
This table presents results for the following regression
ImpV olf,t = θPostPNTR×NTRGapf + δf + δt + εf,t
Where ImpV olf,t is firm f ’s implied volatility across all at the money (.4 <=
|∆| <= .5) puts and call options on day t. The analysis time frame is 5/1/00 -
6/30/00 and the post-PNTR period begins in 5/25/00. Implied volatility data
is from OptionMetrics All regressions include year and firm FEs. Columns (1)
and (2) include all manufacturing firms with available data. Columns (3) and
(4) include only manufacturing firms from the set of the 1,000 largest firms
(by market cap) in the U.S. Standard errors clustered by industry are included
in parentheses. *** indicates significance at 1% level, ** indicates 5%, and *
indicates 10%.
All Firms Large Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Expiration 30 Days 60 Days 30 Days 60 Days
PostPNTRt ×NTRGapf -0.101*** -0.084*** -0.097*** -0.087***
(0.035) (0.030) (0.029) (0.023)
N 34,751 34,751 12,394 12,394
adj. R2 0.940 0.956 0.953 0.97
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Table 3.1: PNTR, Firm Financing, and Employment
Panel A of this table presents results for the following regression:
ln(Emp)f,t=θ1PostPNTRt ×NTRGapf × FCf + θ2PostPNTRt ×NTRGapf
+θ3PostPNTRt × FCf + β′1Xf × PostPNTRt ×NTRGapf
+β′2Xf × PostPNTRt + δf + δi,t + εf,t
Where ln(Emp) is the logarithm of manufacturing employment. f indexes firm, i indexes
industry, and t indexes year. FCf is either net book leverage (column (2)), net market
leverage (column (2)), or cash-to-assets ratio (column (2)), Xf includes controls for pre-
PNTR firm size, age, and pre-PNTR employment growth (∆Emp), δf is a firm fixed effect
and δi,t is an industry-by-year fixed effect. All other variable construction is detailed in
the Appendix. Standard errors clustered by firm are included in parentheses. *** indicates
significance at 1% level, ** indicates 5%, and * indicates 10%. The economic magnitude of
θ1 represents the average amplification a 10% decrease in leverage (5% increase in cash) on
employment’s sensitivity to the NTR Gap.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Diff-in-Diff FC=NBL FC=NML FC=Cash
PostPNTRt ×NTRGapf -0.781*** -0.058 -0.396 0.608
(0.243) (1.458) (1.416) (1.539)
PostPNTRt ×NTRGapf × FCf 2.260** 1.735** -4.490***
(0.878) (0.858) (1.451)
PostPNTRt × FCf -0.839*** -0.670** 1.698***
(0.306) (0.298) (0.550)
PostPNTRt ×NTRGapf × Sizef -0.065 -0.003 -0.087
(0.212) (0.210) (0.212)
PostPNTRt × Sizef -0.047 -0.069 -0.040
(0.071) (0.070) (0.071)
PostPNTRt ×NTRGapf ×Agef 0.026 0.028 0.036
(0.054) (0.053) (0.052)
PostPNTRt ×Agef -0.008 -0.008 -0.011
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
PostPNTRt×NTRGapf ×∆Emp -1.674 -1.551 -1.508
(2.570) (2.585) (2.484)
PostPNTRt ×∆Emp -2.973*** -2.938*** -2.931***
(0.863) (0.869) (0.839)
Econ Mag of θ1 29% 22% 29%
N 11,500 11,500 11,500 11,500
adj. R2 0.919 0.928 0.928 0.928
Year FE X
Firm FE X X X X
Ind × Year FE X X X
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Table 3.2: PNTR, Firm Financing, and Employment - Robustness
This table presents several robustness test for the specification in (3.1). I report the
results for net book leverage, net market leverage, and cash in Panels A-C respectively.
In column (1) ((2)) I use assets (sales) to measure firm size. In column (3) I require that
all firms with the same primary industry classification be assigned the same NTR Gap.
In column (4) I measure exposure to the PNTR policy using only the Non-NTR rates.
Standard errors clustered by firm (industry in column (3)) are included in parentheses.
*** indicates significance at 1% level, ** indicates 5%, and * indicates 10%.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Size= Size= Gap= Gap=
Assets Sales Primary NNTR
Panel A: Net Book Leverage
PostPNTRt ×NTRGapf 0.613
(1.455)
PostPNTRt ×NTRGapf ×
FCf
1.694** 1.732** 2.212*** 2.333**
(0.789) (0.790) (0.777) (0.914)
PostPNTRt × FCf -0.684*** -0.689** -0.792*** -0.904***
(0.276) (0.276) (0.262) (0.333)
PostPNTRt ×NTRGapf ×
Sizef
0.244* 0.230*
(0.137) (0.137)
PostPNTRt × Sizef -0.105** -0.108**
(0.044) (0.045)
Panel B: Net Market Leverage
PostPNTRt ×NTRGapf 0.352
(1.429)
PostPNTRt ×NTRGapf ×
FCf
1.409* 1.438* 1.577** 1.607*
(0.768) (0.766) (0.783) (0.859)
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Table 3.2 – continued
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Size= Size= Gap= Gap=
Assets Sales Primary NNTR
PostPNTRt × FCf -0.600** -0.607* -0.617** -0.656**
(0.272) (0.272) (0.266) (0.312)
PostPNTRt ×NTRGapf ×
Sizef
0.287** 0.273**
(0.137) (0.138)
PostPNTRt × Sizef -0.122*** -0.124***
(0.044) (0.044)
Panel C: Cash
PostPNTRt ×NTRGapf 0.325
(1.429)
PostPNTRt ×NTRGapf ×
FCf
-3.367** -3.319** -4.351*** -4.487***
(1.330) (1.360) (1.206) (1.456)
PostPNTRt × FCf 1.372*** 1.329*** 1.648*** 1.749***
(0.504) (0.513) (0.453) (0.570)
PostPNTRt ×NTRGapf ×
Sizef
0.235* 0.216
(0.137) (0.140)
PostPNTRt × Sizef -0.104** -0.104**
(0.044) (0.045)
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Table 3.2 – continued
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Size= Size= Gap= Gap=
Assets Sales Primary NNTR
N 11,500 11,500 11,500 11,500
adj. R2 0.927 0.927 0.928 0.928
Firm FE X X X X
Ind × Year FE X X X X
SE Cluster Firm Firm Ind. Firm
73
Table 3.3: PNTR, Firm Financing, and Employment - Plant Level
This table presents plant-level estimates of regressions (3.3)-(3.5). All regressions include
fixed effects for the interaction of firm size, age, pre-PNTR employment growth, and plant
industry. Panel A reports results from estimating (3.3), panel B reports results from es-
timating (3.4) and (3.5). Standard errors clustered at the industry level are included in
parentheses. *** indicates significance at 1% level, ** indicates 5%, and * indicates 10%.
The economic magnitude of θ1 represents the average amplification a 10% decrease in lever-
age (5% increase in cash) on employment’s or plant closure’s sensitivity to the NTR Gap.
Panel A: Intensive Marging - ln(Empp,f,t)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Diff-in-Diff FC=NBL FC=NML FC=Cash
PostPNTRt ×NTRGapf -0.351***
(0.081)
PostPNTRt ×NTRGapf × FCf 2.397** 2.523** -8.478***
(0.986) (1.251) (3.288)
PostPNTRt × FCf -0.825*** -0.877** 2.644**
(0.305) (0.429) (1.097)
Econ Mag of θ1 68% 72% 121%
N 62,500 62,500 62,500 62,500
adj. R2 0.923 0.934 0.934 0.934
Year FE X
Plant FE X X X X
δc,i,t X X X
Panel B: Intensive & Extensive Margins
1{Deathp} ∆{Empp}
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Diff-in-Diff FC=NBL FC=NML FC=Cash Diff-in-Diff FC=NBL FC=NML FC=Cash
NTRGapf 0.390*** -0.996***
(0.149) (0.307)
NTRGapf ×
FCf
-0.872 -0.772 5.433*** 3.608** 3.244* -13.710***
(0.818) (1.007) (2.087) (1.418) (1.938) (3.948)
FCf 0.556* 0.516 -1.885*** -1.738*** -1.594** 4.912***
(0.283) (0.391) (0.714) (0.478) (0.738) (1.274)
Econ Mag of θ1 22% 20% 70% 36% 33% 69%
N 5,500 5,500 5,500 5,500 5,500 5,500 5,500 5,500
adj. R2 0.011 0.307 0.306 0.306 0.016 0.287 0.286 0.286
δc,i X X X X X X
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Table 3.5: PNTR, Firm Financing, and Employment - Cross Sectional
Test
This table results for estimating (3.1) for firms with high and low levels of
external finance dependence levels (EFD) using the measure from Rajan and
Zingales (1998). To generate the estimates, I interact each coefficient and
fixed effect in (3.1) with an indicator for whether the firm is above the sample
median for the EFD measure (1{High EFD}). The estimates in column (1)
are the sum of the coefficients of θ1 and θ1 × 1{High EFD}. The p-value in
column (3) is therefore the p-value on the t-stat of the interaction term of the
θ1 coefficient in (3.1) with the high-EFD indicator. F-tests of that coefficient
yield very similar results. Standard errors clustered by firm are in parentheses.
*** indicates significance at 1% level, ** indicates 5%, and * indicates 10%.
(1) (2) (3)
High EFD Low EFD
P-val: High -
Low
Diff-in-Diff -0.705 -0.757 0.947
θ1 NBL 4.634 -0.160 0.009 (***)
θ1 NML 4.039 -0.633 0.019 (**)
θ1 Cash -6.912 0.198 0.047 (**)
N 8,300
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Table 3.6: PNTR & Issuance Activity
This table presents results for the following regression:
yf,i,t=θ1PostPNTRt ×NTRGapf × FCf + θ2PostPNTRt × FCf
+β′1Xf × PostPNTRt ×NTRGapf + β′2Xf × PostPNTRt
+δf + δi,t + εf,t
Where f indexes the unit of observation, i indexes industry, and t indexes year. yf,i,t is the
% increase in total debt outstanding (Debt Issuances - Panel A) or total net proceeds from
equity issuances scaled by total assets (Equity Issuances - Panel B). The unit of observation
is firm-year. FCf is either net book leverage, net market leverage, or cash-to-assets ratio,
Xf includes controls for pre-PNTR firm size, age, and employment growth, δf is a firm
fixed effect, and δi,t is an industry-by-year fixed effect. All other variable construction is
detailed in the Appendix. Standard errors clustered by firm are included in parentheses.
*** indicates significance at 1% level, ** indicates 5%, and * indicates 10%.
Panel A: Debt Issuance
(1) (2) (3)
NBL NML Cash
PostPNTRt ×NTRGapf 2.838** 2.791** 1.846
(1.317) (1.340) (1.315)
PostPNTRt ×NTRGapf × FCf -1.976* -1.600* 5.008**
(1.070) (0.967) (2.160)
PostPNTRt × FCf 0.312 0.048 -1.463*
(0.417) (0.420) (0.819)
N 19,312 19,312 19,312
adj. R2 0.849 0.849 0.849
Controls X X X
Year x Ind FE X X X
Firm FE X X X
Panel B: Equity Issuance
(1) (2) (3)
NBL NML Cash
PostPNTRt ×NTRGapf -0.107 0.049 0.477
(1.089) (1.106) (1.249)
PostPNTRt ×NTRGapf × FCf 1.954* 1.310** -2.014
(1.147) (0.615) (2.761)
PostPNTRt × FCf -0.418 -0.519 0.554
(0.395) (0.707) (0.942)
N 19,312 19,312 19,312
adj. R2 0.231 0.231 0.231
Controls X X X
Year x Ind FE X X X
Firm FE X X X
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Table 3.7: PNTR, Firm Financing, and Reported Offshoring
This table results for estimating (3.7), that is the likelihood of firms to report
offshoring to either China (column (1)) or the rest of the world (ROW - col-
umn (2)). Data on reported offshoring comes from Hoberg and Moon (2017)
and Hoberg and Moon (2018). The coefficient in column (3) is estimated by
interacting the θ1 coefficient in (3.7) with the China indicator. Standard errors
clustered by firm are in parentheses. *** indicates significance at 1% level, **
indicates 5%, and * indicates 10%.
(1) (2) (3)
China
Offshoring
ROW
Offshoring
China - ROW
Diff-in-Diff 0.132* -0.028 0.160*
(0.075) (0.043) (0.087)
θ1 NBL -0.981* 0.357 -1.338**
(0.578) (0.318) (0.659)
θ1 NML -1.456** 0.348 -1.804**
(0.638) (0.359) (0.731)
θ1 Cash 0.073 -0.719 0.793
(0.601) (0.437) (0.743)
N 14,811 14,811
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Table 3.8: Measures of Firm Scale
This table presents results for the following regression:
yf,i,t=θ1PostPNTRt ×NTRGapf × FCf + θ2PostPNTRt × FCf
+β′1Xf × PostPNTRt ×NTRGapf + β′2Xf × PostPNTRt
+δf + δi,t + εf,t
Where f indexes the unit of observation, i indexes industry, and t indexes year. yf,i,t is either
the logarithm of sales (Panel A) or employment (Panel B) by industry segment. The unit of
observation is industry-segment-year. FCf is either net book leverage, net market leverage,
or cash-to-assets ratio, Xf includes controls for pre-PNTR firm size, age, and employment
growth, δf,i is a segment fixed effect, and δi,t is an industry-by-year fixed effect. All other
variable construction is detailed in the Appendix. Standard errors clustered by industry
are included in parentheses. *** indicates significance at 1% level, ** indicates 5%, and *
indicates 10%.
Panel A: Industry Segment Sales
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DiD NBL NML Cash
PostPNTRt ×NTRGapf 0.103
(0.274)
PostPNTRt ×NTRGapf ×
FCf
-0.792** 0.195 0.461
(0.372) (0.402) (1.067)
PostPNTRt × FCf 0.060 -0.080 0.285
(0.139) (0.159) (0.390)
N 26,639 26,639 26,639 26,639
adj. R2 0.919 0.934 0.934 0.934
Controls X X X
Year FE X
Year x Ind FE X X X
Segment FE X X X X
Panel B: Industry Segment Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DiD NBL NML Cash
PostPNTRt ×NTRGapf 0.034
(0.258)
PostPNTRt ×NTRGapf ×
FCf
-0.613 0.548 1.467
(0.666) (0.377) (1.410)
PostPNTRt × FCf 0.008 -0.219 -0.200
(0.235) (0.171) (0.488)
N 12,451 12,451 12,451 12,451
adj. R2 0.932 0.939 0.939 0.939
Controls X X X
Year FE X
Year x Ind FE X X X
Segment FE X X X X
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Table 3.9: PNTR, Firm Financing, and Production
This table presents the results for the following regression
yf,i,t=θ1PostPNTRt ×NTRGapi × FCf + θ2PostPNTRt ×NTRGapi
+θ3PostPNTRt × FCf + β′1Xf × PostPNTRt ×NTRGapi
+β′2Xf × PostPNTRt + δf,i + δf,p + εf,t
In Panel A, y is the material cost index for each input industry i used by firm
f at time t. In Panel B, y is the labor productivity (value add per employee)
for each industry segment i operated by firm f at time t. In Panel C, y is
the natural logarithm of investment in machinery (automation). Xf includes
firm size, age, and pre-PNTR employment growth. δf,i is a firm-industry fixed
effect and δf,p is an industry-period fixed effect. Standard errors clustered at
the industry level are included in parenthesis. *** indicates significance at 1%
level, ** indicates 5%, and * indicates 10%.
(1) (2) (3)
FC=NBL FC=NML FC=Cash
Panel A: Input Costs
θ1 1.518 3.366** -17.160**
(1.368) (1.486) (7.399)
N 3,800 3,800 3,800
Panel B: Labor Productivity
θ1 -1.110** -1.535*** 2.339
(0.521) (0.590) (1.613)
N 15,500 15,500 15,500
Panel C: Automation
θ1 -0.177 0.591 0.780
(1.153) (1.415) (3.015)
N 15,500 15,500 15,500
Controls X X X
Firm × Ind FE X X X
Ind × Year FE X X X
80
Table 3.10: PNTR and Import Growth by FDI Category
Panel A of this table presents results for the following regressions:
ln(V al)p,t=θ1PostPNTRt ×NTRGapp + δp + δt + εp,t
ln(V al)p,t=θ1PostPNTRt ×NTRGapp + θ21{c = Per} × PostPNTRt ×NTRGapp
+δp + δc,t + εp,c,t
Where ln(V al) is the natural logarithm of Chinese imports for products defined at the
six-digit Harmonized System (HS6) level. c ∈ {Per,Res} indicates whether the product
is categorized as permitted (Per) or restricted (Res) for foreign investment based on the
2002 China Guidance Catalog for Foreign Investment. Product categories are from Blonigen
and Ma (2010). δp, δt, and δc,t represent product, year, and category-by-year fixed effects
respectively. The sample period is 1997-2004. Standard errors clustered at the product level
are included in parenthesis. *** indicates significance at 1% level, ** indicates 5%, and *
indicates 10%.
Panel A: Investment Restrictions, PNTR, & Chinese Import Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
y = ln(V alue) Full Sample Permitted Restricted Triple Diff.
PostPNTRt ×NTRGapp 0.428∗∗∗ 0.479∗∗∗ -0.512 -0.512
(0.124) (0.077) (0.435) (0.589)
1{c = Per} × PostPNTRt 0.991∗
×NTRGapp (0.602)
N 17,915 17,226 689 17,915
adj. R2 0.872 0.873 0.810 0.872
Product FE X X X X
Year FE X X X
Category-Year FE X
Panel B presents pre-PNTR the percentage of US imports generated from low income (LI)
countries as well as the country import “HHI” for Permitted and restricted products in
2000.
Panel B: Pre-PNTR Characteristics By Investment Category
(1) (2)
LI Ratio Country “HHI”
Res 0.133∗∗∗ 0.309∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.016)
Per −Res −0.037∗∗ −0.003
(0.018) (0.017)
N 2,445 2,445
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Table 3.11: China FDI Guidelines: Examples of Restricted and En-
couraged Projects
Examples of Encouraged Projects
Textiles
Production of special textile products for engineering applications
Dyeing and finishing of high grade textile materials
Chemical Fiber Manufacturing
Production of high tech chemical fibers
Manufacturing of synthetic rubber
Examples of Restricted Projects
Textiles
Wool and cotton textile. Silk
Chemical Fiber Manufacturing
Production of conventional textile chemical fiber drawing
Rubber Products Manufacturing
Production of lower performance industrial rubber components
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Figure 2.1: PNTR and Implied Volatility
This figure graphs the θk coefficients from the following regression:
ImpV olf,t=
6/30/00∑
k=5/1/00
[
θk1{t = k} ×NTRGapf
]
+ δf + δt + εf,t
Where ImpV olf,t is the daily implied volatility firm f ’s at the money (.4 <=
|∆| <= .5) put & call options with 30 day expiration from time t. The red line
indicates 5/25/00, the event date for the PNTR vote. The analysis time frame
is 5/1/00 - 6/30/00 and the X-axis is displayed in event time (5/25/00=0).
Implied volatility data is from OptionMetrics. The solid lines represent the
point estimates and the dashed lines are 95% confidence intervals based on
standard errors clustered by industry.
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Figure 3.2: PNTR, Firm Financing, and Employment - Dynamics
This Figure graphs the θ1,k coefficients from the following regression:
ln(Emp)f,t=
∑
k∈K
[
θ1,k1{t ∈ k} ×NTRGapf × FCf + θ2,k1{t ∈ k} ×NTRGapf
+θ3,k1{t ∈ k} × FCf + β′1,kXf × 1{t ∈ k} ×NTRGapf
+β′2,kXf × 1{t ∈ k}
]
+ δf + δi,t + εf,t
I divide the sample into four sub-periods: 1) the long-run pre-period (LR−pre
1992-1996); 2) the short-run pre-period (SR−pre 1997-2000); 3) the short-run
post-period (SR−post 2001-2004); and 4) the long-run post-period (LR−post
2005-2007) and denote the set
K = {LR − Pre, SR − Post, LR − Post} with SR − Pre as the reference
period. The remaining variables and standard error clustering are the same as
in (3.1).
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Figure 3.3: PNTR and Materials Cost
This figure graphs the θk coefficients from the following regression:
Matcosti,t=
2007∑
k=1993
[
θk1{t = k} × UpstreamNTRGapi
]
+ δi + δt + εi,t
Where i indexes industry and t indexes year. The solid lines represent the
point estimates (relative to 1992) and the dashed lines are 95% confidence
intervals based on standard errors clustered by industry. Data are from the
NBER-CES dataset.
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Figure 3.4: PNTR and Domestic Productivity
This figure graphs the θk coefficients from the following regression:
LaborProdi,t=
2007∑
k=1993
[
θk1{t = k} ×NTRGapi
]
+ δi + δt + εi,t
Where i indexes industry and t indexes year. The solid lines represent the
point estimates (relative to 1992) and the dashed lines are 95% confidence
intervals based on standard errors clustered by industry. The regression is
weighted by industry employment in 1992. Data are from the NBER-CES
dataset.
87
Figure 3.5: China FDI
This figure graphs annual foreign direct investment in China split out by joint
ventures (JV) and foreign-owned entities (FOE) from 1995-2006. Source: Na-
tional Bureau of Statistics of China.
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Figure 3.6: China Related Party Imports
This figure graphs the percent of all annual U.S. imports arriving from China
and the percentage of Chinese imports from related parties from 1992-2007.
Source: U.S. Census Foreign Trade Statistics.
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Appendices
91
Appendix A
TAA Petitions
I obtain information on offshoring-induced layoffs from the petitions
filed with the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program. The TAA is a
Department of Labor (DOL) managed initiative created by the Trade Act of
1974. Under the program’s mandate, workers who suffer trade-induced lay-
offs are eligible for benefits including job training, extended unemployment
insurance (UI), and relocation and job search allowances. Petitions for these
benefits are made at the establishment level and can be filed by workers,
unions, their (previous) employer, or a state agency. The TAA data represent
perhaps the most comprehensive source of explicit firm-level offshoring activi-
ties, but since parties are under no obligation to file TAA petitions, they likely
underestimate offshoring activities.1
Each petition is assigned a DOL investigator in charge of certifying
that the layoff was indeed trade related. The investigator makes the de-
termination after conducting interviews with employees, customers, and up-
stream/downstream plants, so that the certification is likely precise. All pe-
titions include certification status, the date of the event, and the estimated
1Per Autor et al. (2013), per-capita spending on the TAA program in 2007 amounted to
just $2.
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number of affected workers. Petitions filed after the 2002 Trade Act also
include the reason for the lay off and the countries to which production or
customer demand has switched.
The data are made public by Public Citizen, a non-profit consumer ad-
vocacy group which receives monthly updates of TAA petitions from the DOL
and compiles them into a raw dataset.2 Following Monarch et al. (2017), I de-
fine all layoffs categorized as either company imports or shift in production as
offshoring. This approach leads to just under 11,000 petitions totaling an esti-
mated 1.1 million workers laid off between 1994 and 2016. Mapping the TAA
to firm financial data is difficult since the raw company names from the peti-
tions are ill-suited for algorithmic matching. For example, Fortune Brands is a
holding company that owns a variety of brands such as Masterlock locks, Moen
faucets, and Jim Beam bourbon whiskey and the petitions often reference the
product name rather than the holding company. A further complication is
that Fortune split into two companies in 2011 and the legacy financial data is
listed in Compustat under Beam, Inc. In order to manage this complicated
matching process without discarding too much data, I limit the TAA data
to petition names that have at least one year where the estimated number
of affected workers is greater than or equal to 100. This filter reduces the
amount of unique petition company names to 2,651 (roughly 6,000 petitions),
and these petitions account for an estimated 1 million affected workers. I map
the petitions to Compustat identifiers using a combination of algorithmic and
2The data were downloaded from https://tinyurl.com/ycc7z7jx accessed 11/21/17.
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manual matching. I am able to find Compustat matches for almost 5,000 of
the petitions covering an estimated 700,000 affected workers. Consistent with
the matching strategy, I define firms as offshorers in a given year if they lay off
at least 100 workers in that year. Of the 2,510 active manufacturing firms in
1999, 294 are classified as offshorers between 2003-2016. Of those 294 firms,
80 list China as one of the offshoring destinations.
Table A.1 presents summary statistics for the offshoring and non-offshoring
manufacturers in the Compustat universe. “Raw differences” (columns (1)-(3))
between offshorers and non-offshores are derived from t-tests of sample means.
Differences adjusting for industry fixed effects (columns (4) and (5)) are es-
timated from a regression of each relevant variable on an offshoring dummy
and industry fixed effects. In line with the extant literature, offshoring firms
tend to be larger and more profitable. These differences exist across the raw
and industry-adjusted measures. This “offshoring premium,” even within the
sample of relatively larger and public firms, is congruent with the fixed-cost-
induced selection mechanism promoted in Melitz-style models. Consistent
with Monarch et al. (2017), offshorers are also more capital intense, hold a
larger proportion of fixed assets, and have lower market-to-book ratios. In
terms of univariate correlations between financial capacity and (future) off-
shoring activity, the sample of offshorers hold lower cash balances, and higher
leverage ratios. However, accounting for industry drastically reduces even this
univariate disparity.
To the extent that data on offshoring to China exists, one should also
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expect the incidence of offshoring to positively correlate with exposure to
PNTR. To test this hypothesis, I analyze whether Chinese offshoring propen-
sity, as reported in the TAA data, is higher in industries with larger NTR Gaps.
Since the TAA petitions prior to the 2002 Trade Act do not provide lay-off
reasons or the responsible countries, I cannot conduct a traditional difference
in difference test. However, I can examine whether NTR is more strongly as-
soicated with offshoring to China than to other countries. If the uncertainty
reduction associated with PNTR indeed improved offshoring incentives, then
we should observe a positive association between the NTR Gap and offshoring
propensity to China. Furthermore, since PNTR was a China-specific policy,
the NTR Gap should not be positively associated with increased offshoring to
other countries. To test this claim, I use the TAA-Compustat matched sample
to estimate the following regression
1{Offshore}xf = α + θ1NTRGapf + εf (A.1)
Where 1{Offshore}xf is an indicator that firm f had at least one offshoring
event to country x from 2003-2016. The petitions mostly mention multi-
ple destination countries and so Chinese offshorers (x = China) are those
who list China as one of the destination countries. Non-Chinese offshorers
(x = Ex − China) are those who do not list China as a destination country.
Firm-level NTRGapf is calculated as the weighted average of industry NTR
Gaps across all of the firm’s operating segments, with segment sales as the
weights. I estimate (A.1) for each x ∈ {China,Ex− China} jointly within a
SUR system to allow for comparison of coefficients across specifications. The
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sample includes all manufacturing firms with Compustat employment data in
1999. Table A.2 displays the results of the analysis. The NTR Gap is pos-
itively, yet statistically insignificantly, related with offshoring to China (col-
umn (1)). However, it is significantly negatively associated with offshoring to
other countries (column (2)), which suggests firms shifted focus to Chinese off-
shoring. A χ2 test strongly rejects equality of θ1 across the two specifications.
Monarch et al. (2017) argue that the reduction in uncertainty should
matter more for the largest employers, as they are the most likely to be able
to absorb the fixed costs of offshoring. To capture this differential response, I
estimate the following regression
1{Offshore}xf = θ1NTRGapf×ln(Emp)f+θ2NTRGapf+θ3 ln(Emp)f+δi+εf
(A.2)
ln(Emp) is measured as of 1999. I estimate (A.2) both without (columns (3)
and (4)) and with (columns (5) and (6)) industry fixed effects. The coefficient
of interest is again θ1 which now measures whether larger firms are more likely
to be offshorers in higher NTR Gap industries. Consistent with the hypothesis
that PNTR is a uniquely Chinese offshoring shock, θ1 is positive and significant
when x = China (columns (3) and (5)) and negative when x = Ex − China
(columns (4) and (6)). Equality of θ1 is again strongly rejected. It should
be noted that this analysis is subject to several caveats. The first is that
offshoring activity is self-reported. Additionally, since the data starts in 2003,
I cannot test whether PNTR leads to a shift in offshoring propensity from
the pre-period. While this evidence should be taken with a grain of salt it
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nonetheless comports with the anecdotes referenced above.
97
Table A.1: Offshoring Premium
This table presents firm-level summary stats for the sample of offshoring v.
non-offshoring manufacturing firms. I define firms as offshorers if, per the
TAA petition data, they lay off at least 100 workers in any year from 2003-
2016. Financial variables are measured in 1999, the year prior to the PNTR
vote. Variable definitions are included in the appendix. The sample includes
all Compustat manufacturers with employment data in 1999. *** indicates
significance at 1% level, ** indicates 5%, and * indicates 10%.
Raw Difference Industry FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable Offshoring
Non-
Offshoring
P-Val
Diff
Offshoring
Diff
P-Val
Diff
ln(asset) 7.057 3.974 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2.695 ∗ ∗ ∗
ln(emp) 1.943 −1.240 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2.675 ∗ ∗ ∗
age 25.517 12.884 ∗ ∗ ∗ 9.879 ∗ ∗ ∗
Mkt Cap 8.347 0.947 ∗ ∗ ∗ 8.681 ∗ ∗ ∗
max{ROA, 0} 0.151 0.090 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.050 ∗ ∗ ∗
max{NPM, 0} 0.146 0.084 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.055 ∗ ∗ ∗
TFP −0.214 −0.398 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.170 ∗ ∗ ∗
Tangibility 0.283 0.228 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.020 ∗∗
ln(CapitalIntense) 3.710 3.382 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.247 ∗ ∗ ∗
M2B 2.159 4.411 ∗ ∗ ∗ −1.286
NetBkLev 0.230 0.145 0.002
NetMktLev 0.171 0.072 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.028 ∗
Cash
Assets
0.082 0.216 ∗ ∗ ∗ −0.065 ∗ ∗ ∗
N 294 2, 216
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Table A.2: NTR Gap and Offshoring Propensity
This table presents results for the following regressions:
1{Offshore}xf=α + θ1NTRGapf + εf
1{Offshore}xf=θ1NTRGapf × ln(Emp)f + θ2NTRGapf + θ3 ln(Emp)f + δi + εf
Where 1{Offshore}xf is an indicator that firm f had at least one offshoring
event to country x from 2003-2016. δi is an industry fixed effect. The sample
includes all manufacturing firms with Compustat employment data in 1999.
ln(Emp) is measured as of 1999. The regressions for x ∈ {China,Ex−China}
are estimated jointly in a SUR system to allow comparison of coefficients
across the specifications. The last row contains a χ2 test of θChina1 = θ
Ex−China
1
Standard errors are included in parenthesis. *** indicates significance at 1%
level, ** indicates 5%, and * indicates 10%.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
x = China
Ex−
China
China
Ex−
China
China
Ex−
China
NTRGapf 0.021 −0.107∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.060 0.164 0.351∗
(0.033) (0.049) (0.033) (0.046) (0.145) (0.200)
ln(Emp)f 0.011
∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.011∗ 0.068∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008)
NTRGapf × ln(Emp)f 0.030∗∗ −0.030 0.027∗ −0.041∗
(0.014) (0.020) (0.016) (0.022)
θChina1 =
θEx−China1 (χ
2)
6.77∗∗∗ 7.80∗∗∗ 8.09∗∗∗
N 2,510 2,510 2,510 2,510 2,510 2,510
N Offshore 80 183 80 183 80 183
Industry FE X X
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Appendix B
Data Construction
B.1 Construction of Materials Costs
The quinquennial CMF includes surveys on productions materials pur-
chased by each establishment. Each (reported) purchased input is assigned an
industry code - 4-digit SIC in earlier vintages of the CMF and 6-digit NAICS
in latter vintages - as well trailing digits to identify individual products. The
CMF also contains the total cost of said input and to a lesser degree, the
quantity purchased. To generate a dataset of firm-level input cost indices I
proceed in the following way. First I drop all inputs for which a quantity is
unavailable. Next I aggregate all costs and quantities at the firm-industry
level. I then map each input industry to its constant manufacturing family
based on concordances in Pierce and Schott (2016). Finally, I construct the
firm’s input cost index for a given industry by dividing aggregated costs by
aggregate quantities.
One complication in this process is certain products do not map to
official SIC or NAICS industries. These instances often occur when establish-
ments self-report production inputs that are not on the set of pre-specified
products in the Census survey form. I allocate these products to their respec-
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tive industries by iteratively matching on coarser (e.g. 3-digit SIC or 5-digit
NAICS) codes using the available inputs as weights.
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Table B.1: Variable Construction
Compustat Variables: Compustat variable names in italics.
Variable Definition Note
Net Book Leverage dltt+dlc−che
at
Net Market Leverage dltt+dlc−che
at+prcc f∗csho−ceq
Cash to Assets che
at
ln(emp) ln(emp)
ln(sale) ln(sale) Annual segment sales, replaced with
firm sales for companies not in the
Compustat segment files. Values are
deflated by industry price indices
from Becker et al. (2013).
ROA oibdp
at
NPM oibdp
sale
Tangiblity ppent
at
ln(CapitalIntense) ln(ppent
emp
)
Market-to-Book prcc f∗csho+at−ceq
at
MNC Flag Flag ∈ {0, 1} = 1 if the company reports multiple
geographic segments.
Foreign Income Flag Flag ∈ {0, 1} = 1 if the company reports pifo > 0
in any pre-PNTR year.
INV EST capx
OCF fopt+ ∆invt+ recch+ apalch ∆ indicates 1-year difference.
When missing, fopt is replaced with
ibc+ dpc+ txdc+ esubs+ sppiv + fopo.
TFP Data from I˙mrohorog˘lu and Tu¨zel (2014)
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Census Variables
Variable Definition Note
ln(emp) ln(E) Employment data E are the March 12 headcount snapshots
provided in the LBD.
TFP Log of deflated revenue minus the log of inputs, weighted by
the average cost share (βi) for each input i across industries.
Data are from CMF. Normalized by industry to µ = 0, σ = 1.
LaborProd V A
E
Value-add V A and employment E data are obtained from
the CMF. V A is deflated by industry price indices
from Becker et al. (2013). Normalized by industry to µ = 0, σ = 1.
ln(CapitalIntense) ln(K/E) Capital K and employment E data are obtained from the CMF.
MatCost ln(Q/P ) Material quantity Q and cost P data are obtained
from the CMF material trailer files. Cost is deflated by
materials cost indices from Becker et al. (2013).
MachCapex ln(M) Machinery expenditures M are obtained form the CMF.
Values are deflated by investment cost indices
from Becker et al. (2013).
Other Variables
Variable Note
AR[Day Of] Stock return net of CRSP value-weighted index.
CAR[-1,10] Stock return net of CRSP value-weighted index - summed over
t− 1 to t+ 10.
ln(V al) Customs value of imports obtained from U.S. Census Bureau.
103
Bibliography
Daron Acemoglu, David Autor, David Dorn, Gordon H. Hanson, and Brendan
Price. Import competition and the great US employment sag of the 2000s.
Journal of Labor Economics, 34(S1):S141–S198, 2016. doi: 10.1086/682384.
URL https://doi.org/10.1086/682384.
Anat R Admati, Peter M DeMarzo, Martin F Hellwig, and Paul Pfleiderer.
The leverage ratchet effect. The Journal of Finance, 73(1):145–198, 2018.
Andres Almazan and Carlos A Molina. Intra-industry capital structure disper-
sion. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 14(2):263–297, 2005.
Mary Amiti, Robert C. Dai, Mi an Feenstra, and John Romalis. How did
china’s wto entry benefit u.s. consumers? Technical report, National Bureau
of Economic Research, 2017. NBER Working Paper 23487.
Pol Antra`s and Elhanan Helpman. Global sourcing. Journal of Politi-
cal Economy, 112(3):552–580, 2004. doi: 10.1086/383099. URL https:
//doi.org/10.1086/383099.
David Autor, David Dorn, Gordon H Hanson, Gary Pisano, and Pian Shu.
Foreign competition and domestic innovation: Evidence from US patents,.
2016a. NBER Working Paper 22879.
104
David H Autor, David Dorn, and Gordon H Hanson. The China syndrome:
Local labor market effects of import competition in the United States. The
American Economic Review, 103(6):2121–2168, 2013.
David H Autor, David Dorn, Gordon H Hanson, and Jae Song. Trade adjust-
ment: Worker-level evidence. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 129(4):
1799–1860, 2014.
David H Autor, David Dorn, and Gordon H Hanson. The China shock:
Learning from labor-market adjustment to large changes in trade. Annual
Review of Economics, 8:205–240, 2016b.
Tania Babina. Destructive creation at work: How financial distress spurs
entrepreneurship. 2017.
Shantanu Banerjee, Sudipto Dasgupta, and Yungsan Kim. Buyer–supplier
relationships and the stakeholder theory of capital structure. the Journal of
finance, 63(5):2507–2552, 2008.
Randy Becker, Wayne Gray, and Jordan Marvakov. NBER-CES manufac-
turing industry database: Technical notes,. 2013. NBER Working Paper
5809.
Jan Bena and Elena Simintzi. Globalization of work and innovation: Evidence
from doing business in china. Available at SSRN 2613248, 2017.
Efraim Benmelech, Nittai K Bergman, and Amit Seru. Financing labor. 2011.
NBER Working Paper 17144.
105
Andrew B Bernard, Jonathan Eaton, J Bradford Jensen, and Samuel Kortum.
Plants and productivity in international trade. The American Economic
Review, 93(4):1268–1290, 2003.
Olivier Jean Blanchard, Florencio Lopez-de Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer. What
do firms do with cash windfalls? Journal of Financial Economics, 36(3):
337–360, 1994.
Bruce A. Blonigen and Alyson C. Ma. Please pass the catch-up: The relative
performance of Chinese and foreign firms in Chinese exports. In Robert C.
Feenstra and Shang-Jin We, editors, China’s Growing Role in World Trade,
chapter 12, pages 475–509. University of Chicago Press, 2010.
Nicholas Bloom, Kyle Handley, and Philip Kurman, Andre an Luck. The
impact of Chinese trade: The good, the bad and the apocryphal,. 2018.
Working Paper.
Christoph E Boehm, Aaron Flaaen, and Nitya Pandalai-Nayar. Multinationals,
offshoring, and the decline of US manufacturing. 2017. U.S. Census Bureau
Center of Economic Studies Working Paper.
Patrick Bolton and David S Scharfstein. A theory of predation based on agency
problems in financial contracting. The American Economic Review, pages
93–106, 1990.
Lorenzo Bretscher. From local to global: Offshoring and asset prices. 2018.
Working Paper.
106
Kate Bronfenbrenner, James Burke, Stephanie Luce, Robert Hickey,
Tom Juravich, Elissa Braunstein, and Jerry Epstein. Impact of US-
China trade relations on workers, wages, and employment,. 2001.
United States Trade Deficit Review Commission Research Paper.
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/tdrc/research/research.html.
Thomas Chaney. Liquidity constrained exporters. Journal of Economic Dy-
namics and Control, 72:141–154, 2016.
Judith A Chevalier. Capital structure and product-market competition:
Empirical evidence from the supermarket industry. The American Economic
Review, pages 415–435, 1995.
Gabriel Chodorow-Reich. The employment effects of credit market disruptions:
Firm-level evidence from the 2008–9 financial crisis. The Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 129(1):1–59, 2013.
Helene Cooper and Ian Johnson. Opening doors: Congress’s vote primes U.S.
firms to boost investments in China. Wall Street Journal, May 2000. May
25, 2000.
Ken Davies and Dagmar Balve-Hauff. The regulatory framework for FDI in
China. In OECD Investment Policy Review of China: Progress and Reform
Challenges, chapter 3. OECD Publications Service, 2003.
Steven J Davis, John Haltiwanger, and Scott Schuh. Small business and job
107
creation: Dissecting the myth and reassessing the facts. Small Business
Economics, 8(4):297–315, 1996.
Mihir A Desai, C Fritz Foley, and James R Hines. Domestic effects of the for-
eign activities of us multinationals. American Economic Journal: Economic
Policy, 1(1):181–203, 2009.
Charan Devereaux and Robert Lawrence. The eagle and the dragon: The
November 1999 U.S.-China bilateral agreement and the battle over PNTR,
December 2004. Harvard Case Study, HKS476.
Burcu Duygan-Bump, Alexey Levkov, and Judit Montoriol-Garriga. Financing
constraints and unemployment: Evidence from the great recession. Journal
of Monetary Economics, 75:89–105, 2015.
Avraham Ebenstein, Ann Harrison, Margaret McMillan, and Shannon
Phillips. Estimating the impact of trade and offshoring on American workers
using the Current Population Surveys. Review of Economics and Statistics,
96(4):581–595, 2014.
Steven M Fazzari, R Glenn Hubbard, Bruce C Petersen, Alan S Blinder, and
James M Poterba. Financing constraints and corporate investment. Brook-
ings Papers on Economic Activity, 1988(1):141–206, 1988.
Robert C Feenstra, John Romalis, and Peter K Schott. US imports, exports,
and tariff data, 1989-2001,. 2002. NBER Working Paper 9387.
108
Teresa C Fort, Justin R Pierce, and Peter K Schott. New perspectives on the
decline of us manufacturing employment. Journal of Economic Perspectives,
32(2):47–72, 2018.
Laurent Fresard. Financial strength and product market behavior: The real
effects of corporate cash holdings. The Journal of Finance, 65(3):1097–1122,
2010.
C. Fritz Foley and Kalina Manova. International trade, multinational activity,
and corporate finance. Annual Review of Economics, 7(1):119–146, 2015.
doi: 10.1146/annurev-economics-080614-115453. URL https://doi.org/
10.1146/annurev-economics-080614-115453.
Xavier Giroud and Holger M Mueller. Firm leverage, consumer demand, and
employment losses during the great recession. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 132(1):271–316, 2017.
Gene M Grossman and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg. Trading tasks: A simple
theory of offshoring. American Economic Review, 98(5):1978–97, 2008.
Charles J Hadlock and Joshua R Pierce. New evidence on measuring financial
constraints: Moving beyond the KZ index. The Review of Financial Studies,
23(5):1909–1940, 2010.
Kyle Handley and Nuno Limao. Trade and investment under policy uncer-
tainty: theory and firm evidence. American Economic Journal: Economic
Policy, 7(4):189–222, 2015.
109
Gerard Hoberg and S Katie Moon. Offshore activities and financial vs opera-
tional hedging. Journal of Financial Economics, 125(2):217–244, 2017.
Gerard Hoberg and S Katie Moon. The offshoring return premium. Manage-
ment Science, 2018.
Johan Hombert and Adrien Matray. Can innovation help US manufacturing
firms escape import competition from China? The Journal of Finance, 73
(5):2003–2039, 2018.
Mitsuru Igami. Industry dynamics of offshoring: The case of hard disk drives.
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 10(1):67–101, 2018.
Ays¸e I˙mrohorog˘lu and S¸elale Tu¨zel. Firm-level productivity, risk, and return.
Management Science, 60(8):2073–2090, 2014.
Ron S Jarmin and Javier Miranda. The longitudinal business database,. 2002.
U.S. Census Bureau Center of Economic Studies Working Paper.
Jayant R Kale and Husayn Shahrur. Corporate capital structure and the
characteristics of suppliers and customers. Journal of Financial Economics,
83(2):321–365, 2007.
Steven N Kaplan and Luigi Zingales. Do investment-cash flow sensitivities
provide useful measures of financing constraints? The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 112(1):169–215, 1997.
110
Bryan Kelly, L’ubosˇ Pa´stor, and Pietro Veronesi. The price of political un-
certainty: Theory and evidence from the option market. The Journal of
Finance, 71(5):2417–2480, 2016.
Alex Keto. White House still does not have the votes for China PNTR. Dow
Jones News Service, May 2000. May 24, 2000. Accessed via Factiva.
Naveen Khanna and Sheri Tice. Strategic responses of incumbents to new
entry: The effect of ownership structure, capital structure, and focus. The
Review of Financial Studies, 13(3):749–779, 2000.
Brian K Kovak, Lindsay Oldenski, and Nicholas Sly. The labor market effects
of offshoring by us multinational firms: Evidence from changes in global tax
policies. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2017.
NBER Working Paper 23947.
Owen Lamont. Cash flow and investment: Evidence from internal capital
markets. The Journal of Finance, 52(1):83–109, 1997.
Owen Lamont, Christopher Polk, and Jesu´s Saaa´-Requejo. Financial con-
straints and stock returns. The Review of Financial Studies, 14(2):529–554,
2001.
Larry Lang, Eli Ofek, and Rene´ M Stulz. Leverage, investment, and firm
growth. Journal of Financial Economics, 40(1):3–29, 1996.
Mark T Leary and Michael R Roberts. Do firms rebalance their capital struc-
tures? The Journal of Finance, 60(6):2575–2619, 2005.
111
Minwen Li, Tanakorn Makaew, and Vojislav Maksimovic. Who benefits from
the decline of american manufacturing? Evidence from 142,663 foreign and
domestic entries in China. Available at SSRN 3298502, 2018.
Ildiko Magyari. Firm reorganization, Chinese imports, and US manufacturing
employment. 2017. Working Paper.
Vojislav Maksimovic and Sheridan Titman. Financial policy and reputation
for product quality. The Review of Financial Studies, 4(1):175–200, 1991.
Kalina Manova. Credit constraints, heterogeneous firms, and international
trade. Review of Economic Studies, 80(2):711–744, 2013.
Kalina Manova and Zhihong Yu. How firms export: Processing vs. ordinary
trade with financial frictions. Journal of International Economics, 100:120–
137, 2016.
Marc J Melitz. The impact of trade on intra-industry reallocations and aggre-
gate industry productivity. Econometrica, 71(6):1695–1725, 2003.
Ryan Monarch, Jooyoun Park, and Jagadeesh Sivadasan. Domestic gains from
offshoring? Evidence from TAA-linked US microdata. Journal of Interna-
tional Economics, 105:150–173, 2017.
Tim C Opler and Sheridan Titman. Financial distress and corporate perfor-
mance. Journal of Finance, pages 1015–1040, 1994.
112
Harry J. Pearce. Statement of Harry J. Pearce, Vice Chairman and Chief
Financial Officer, Tyco Toys, Inc., June 1996. China Most-Favored-Nation
(MFN) Status. Hearing before the Committee on Finance, United States
Senate, One Hundred Fourth Congress, Second Session.
Michael M. Phillips. Lawmakers are warned to back China trade or lose con-
tributions. Wall Street Journal, February 2000a. February 9, 2000.
Michael M. Phillips. Big business lobbies hard as House China vote nears.
Wall Street Journal, May 2000b. May 23, 2000. Accessed via Factiva.
Justin R Pierce and Peter K Schott. Concording US harmonized system codes
over time. Journal of Official Statistics, 2009.
Justin R Pierce and Peter K Schott. The surprisingly swift decline of US
manufacturing employment. The American Economic Review, 106(7):1632–
1662, 2016.
Robert S Pindyck. Investments of uncertain cost. Journal of financial Eco-
nomics, 34(1):53–76, 1993.
Raghuram G Rajan and Luigi Zingales. Financial dependence and growth.
The American Economic Review, 88(3):559–586, 1998.
Joshua D Rauh. Investment and financing constraints: Evidence from the
funding of corporate pension plans. The Journal of Finance, 61(1):33–71,
2006.
113
Peter K Schott. The relative sophistication of Chinese exports. Economic
Policy, 23(53):6–49, 2008.
Steven A Sharpe. Financial market imperfections, firm leverage, and the cycli-
cality of employment. The American Economic Review, 84(4):1060–1074,
1994.
Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny. Fire sales in finance and macroeconomics.
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 25(1):29–48, 2011.
Andrei Shleifer and Robert W Vishny. Liquidation values and debt capacity:
A market equilibrium approach. The Journal of Finance, 47(4):1343–1366,
1992.
Thomas F. St. Maxens. Statement of Thomas F. St. Maxens, St. Maxens
and Company, on behalf of Mattel, Inc., El Segundo, CA, February 2000.
U.S.-China Bilateral Trade Agreement and the Accession of China to the
WTO. Hearing before the Committee on Ways and Means, House of Rep-
resentatives, One Hundred Sixth Congress, Second Session, February 16,
2000. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office.
Associated Press. No word on agreement as U.S.-China talks continue. Novem-
ber 1999a. November 14, 1999.
Associated Press. WTO deal with China said close. November 1999b. Novem-
ber 9, 1999.
114
Business Wire. Honeywell CEO advocates granting permanent normal trade
relations status -PNTR- to China this year emphasizes essential role PNTR
will play in unlocking benefits of WTO agreement. February 2000. February
16, 2000.
Congress Daily. High tech industry cites China PNTR as top priority. February
2000. February 9, 2000.
Dow Jones Business News. China signs trade deal with U.S., paving way for
entry into WTO. November 1999. November 15, 1999, 1:03AM.
New York Times. U.S. reaches an accord to open China economy as worldwide
market. November 1999. November 16, 1999.
United States General Accounting Office, 1994.
Sheridan Titman. The effect of capital structure on a firm’s liquidation deci-
sion. Journal of Financial Economics, 13(1):137–151, 1984.
Sheridan Titman and Roberto Wessels. The determinants of capital structure
choice. The Journal of Finance, 43(1):1–19, 1988.
Matthew Vita. China trade vote puts some Democrats in a quandary. The
Washington Postl, March 2000. March 20, 2000.
Toni M Whited. Debt, liquidity constraints, and corporate investment:
Evidence from panel data. The Journal of Finance, 47(4):1425–1460, 1992.
115
Toni M Whited and Guojun Wu. Financial constraints risk. The Review of
Financial Studies, 19(2):531–559, 2006.
Luigi Zingales. Survival of the fittest or the fattest? Exit and financing in the
trucking industry. The Journal of Finance, 53(3):905–938, 1998.
116
Vita
Avishai Schiff was born in Jerusalem, Israel. He received a B.A. from
the Plan II Honors Program and A B.B.A. in Finance from the McCombs
School of Business at the University of Texas at Austin in 2007. Prior to
graduate school he worked as a litigation consultant at Cornerstone Research.
Permanent address: avischiff@gmail.com
This manuscript was typed by the author.
117
